Many a modern man has prayed with that jailed utopian priest of centuries ago, Campanella, "that Eternal Reason may compose all human kingdoms in Once, before Chaos renders all things into the one." Chaos still holds the advantages; the minds of men disintegrate on passing their territorial borders. Of the areas that concern all, a dump has been made. There the garbage of man's mind has been unloaded in unthinking exploitation of nature and man, and in destructive and antisocial conduct.
The control of this practice has been urged from time to time by men to whom it has been revealed what foul pools they themselves and their own societies floated in, and by men who, through ambition for-power or wealth for themselves and their groups or through being cast into the dump by their own kind, have tried to transform the waste into a garden.
To a person who has been raised without fears and hatred, it is usually a wonder, an aesthetic pleasure, and an intellectual revelation to travel over the boundaries among people both within his own society and abroad. He witnesses the fecundity of the human mind, the underlying commonalty of conduct, and if he is disappointed in the failures of other types of people by his standards, the disappointment is mitigated by the relatively comparable condition of his own kind.
To those whose minds have from childhood been trained to segregation of peoples, the outside world is positioned much differently. Apart from a few exceptions, psychosis is the norm. Moral codes for adapting to their own society are more or less abandoned in dealing with outsiders. Wild, mad, hostile feelings with regard to those outside the nation go unreproved and unpunished; under circumstances defined by the government, these feelings may be vented actually in corresponding behavior. This total normal psychosis is given symbolic dress in the notion of sovereignty, a dreadful psychological mechanism whose every exuberant puff costs a disaster.
Granted the psychology, the social machinery is deducible. Nations face one another with trickery in their hearts and weapons in their hands. The coarse simplicity of territory boundaries enables even the most stupid to find targets for their trumpery and weapons. The international order works on the model of a territorial system capable of permitting the crudest psychology to function with the least doubt with the vilest tools.
Under such circumstances, whatever system is used to attack and destroy the existing system has to work above, beneath and around it. Since this can never be enough, the revolutionary system has to work in 3600 of contact. It must somehow use components of the existing system. It has to undermine and simultaneously use the system. All historical attempts at megalorders exhibit in varying degree the dual character of international revolution with the aid of a pre-existing national instrument. They perceive dimly, partially, and unconsciously the 3600 need. The Kalotic Revolution sees it clearly.
Inasmuch as history is written, published, and read largely within the confines and under the protection of a nation, it stresses the statal instrument.1 Indeed the excesses of historiography are such that a people does not often recognize the sources of its own strength in extending its boundaries. And almost invariably, any success is ascribed to the parochial rather than to the universal component. North Americans often fail to see that their prolonged favourable reception in Latin America came more from their exemplary republican institution than from predatory business operations; Russians often forget that American material support and sympathy helped propel their sturdy armies into central Europe between 1943 and 1945. Again, the need for a kalotic history needs stressing.
The ancient and traditional Chinese empire extended its rule in an integrated form, by force of arms. Repeatedly, these arms have failed it, but just as often, a dynasty has arisen to make effective again the enlarging concept of a Chinese culture, nationally destined to be united into a megalorder in imperial form. the world outside of Chinese culture was held to be a barbarian world, worthy of only small consideration.2
By contrast
the expansion of Indian civilization to those countries and islands of the Orient where Chinese civilization, with strikingly similar aspirations, seemed to arrive ahead of it, is one of the outstanding events in the history of the world... The Chinese proceeded by conquest and annexation... Indian penetration of infiltration seems almost always to have been peaceful.. The Indians nowhere engaged in military conquest and annexation in the name of s state or mother country.
The Chinese megarchy was limited by Chinese conquest, the Indian by its commercial navigation. Countries conquered by China had to copy her major institutions; those influenced by Indians kept their own essential institutions and changed the culture-mix to suit themselves.
The Bible strove to adapt its grand idea of a single God over man into the integrated imperial aspirations of a struggling set of related tribes. The ancient Egyptian and Persian empires were more involved in the techniques of organizing vassal peoples. The Alexandrian empire had in mind a culturally integrated Greco--Oriental commonwealth which shortly thereafter subsided into a set of typical Oriental megalorders of familial rule focused upon a special people and vassal states, so far as their sheer power would take them. The Roman integrated their Italian domains, reached out for vassal states, extended considerable self-rule to many areas, and then amalgamated such areas into the Italian state, with an ultimate integrated empire operating under a common code of law and rights.4
The Arabs, like the Alexandrians, founded their empire upon a charismatic leader with ambitions for cultural integration of new acquisitions. It foundered over the succession as well; but its cultural expansion remains, even after the tide of empire fell back.
The medieval Christian Church, although more taxocratic than the Muslim religion, was also forced, in many encounters over centuries of time that ended in 1870, to surrender its sword in order to retain its license over souls of all nations.
French, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese empires, and the British empire after them, created sets of peoples composed of vassal states of artificially formed administrative orders, and of self-reflecting states that were led and partially peopled by the dominant ethnic strain.
The Napoleonic empire was an Alexandrian kind and the Austro--Hungarian empire was a union of culturally related peoples under a dynasty. The Russian Empire was the same, with the addition of a large Asiatic territory that it tried to colonize and administer arbitrarily through designees of the ruling dynasty. The Russian Soviet Union, which succeeded the empire, depersonalized its form of rule, and created an integrated union of peoples, Nazi Germany formed an empire around racism, totalitarianism, and foreign vassal states.
In toto, no more than half a dozen basic pure types of magarchy have existed, but by a combination of basic forms, dozens of mixed types have occurred, and, of course, in many ways each example of a historical megarchy is unique in its origins, ideology, behavior, and effects.5
All of these empires had a cultural impact that outlasted their forceful control. All ended, apart from the recent Soviet case, because their justification appeared inadequate and their force could not serve indefinitely to counter widespread disbelief within and without their nuclear boundaries. The failure of justification, which is more appropriately termed the failure to establish and maintain political consensus, was owing to several cause, which may be graduated into principles controlling the conduct of megalorders.
Megarchic revolution has often expanded by the use of religious and nationalistic feelings. Just as often, it has failed because of the same feelings on the part of others. For example, these two great sets of potentially opposing forces have been the enemies of Marxist-Leninism. They have not been conquered by Leninism; on the contrary, they have beaten communism to its knees, internally and in foreign affairs. It has no longer the possibility of extending its revolution as a single intact ideology. By contrast the Kalotic Revolution should be able, because of its beliefs and theories, not because of any lies or tricks, to avoid the full force of their opposition and to use them in some ways as wind for its sails.
Nationalism is a strong emotion, among some part at least, of all states, and of subjected peoples as well, even when it is not chauvinism of the type mentioned above. It is based on a collection of psychological and cultural affinities, no one of which is sufficient, but all of which together are more than enough to make a people nationalistic.6 The cry for self-determination is allied with the nationalism of subject-peoples.
In a sense, nationalism is in many places what remains of a megarchy, as in Germany, Italy, Indonesia, and the United States, which were once divided into many states. But once achieving unity, the new toparchy becomes exclusive and nationalistic as a whole, not through changes in all people but through changes in some of them, through new generations, and as a result of a changed social metabolism that metamorphoses the original social body.
Although nationalism seems to be an efficient myth for freeing the hand of the government in international operation, the same myth can freeze the hand of government when it reaches out to achieve some subtle maneuver or to accomplish equality among men-in-states. Its close relation to the "normal psychosis" of chauvinism -- its distorted perceptions, uncontrollability, and intensity of feeling -- make nationalism dangerous to manipulate.
Communism has discovered there facts, but not profited form them. Once having purged itself of its pure internationalism and pure hostility to nationalism, the U.S.S.R. found itself to be Old Mother Russia. Meanwhile, its pleas of Internationalism had driven non-workers and other nations elsewhere into fiercer nationalism and reactionary religions, whether they believed that the U.S.S.R. was internationalist or believed the pleas to be a Russian nationalist trick.
Then the Soviet rulers and Russian nationalism for internal consolidation against the Germans in World War II and against ethnic minorities (Cossacks, Jews, Armenians, et al.) for allegedly undermining the Soviet state. With the loss of its internationalist vocabulary and under the lash of its own nationalism, it alienated its satellites, Yugoslavia, China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Rumania, and excited nationalism among them. Friendly communist parties in Italy, France, and elsewhere were cast into doubt about Soviet attitudes towards the world communist movement.
Nationalism is a less strongly developed emotion in plutocratic states, but it is still far more powerful than any other political sentiment practically everywhere. America as a megarchic force has been blocked by contradictions similar in kind, if not in scale, to those found in the Soviet Union.
What, then, does the Kalotic Revolution intend to substitute for the Soviet and American experience? Will it, too, find nationalism an insuperable barrier to the spread of its doctrines and institutions? It will not, if it can construct a housing for national sentiment.
There are five Rules for Kalotic Nationalism. The new cosmarchy is to be federal and its components autonomous in many ways; the structure will not require the eviction of national ideals. Second, nationalism has beneficial features when it is subdued; it can fashion, under tutelage, altruistic attitudes within the toparchy, and it can often provide a necessary stubbornness against the loss of local liberties. Third, the nation-states are to be reasonably represented in the constitution; there is no domination by population masses or the world centers of wealth. Fourth, many of the new revolutionary structures, such as the World Community Councils and World Associations Boards, carry on their affairs off the mainstream of nationalism and traditional political quarrels. Fifth, the Kalotic cosmarchy proclaims peace and peaceful instrumentalities of reform rather than the subjection and elimination of peoples.
All of these principles guarantee that the Kalotic Revolution will not suffer the disastrous self-contradictions that communism has experienced with nationalism. It is the right time for a new mobilization of toparchic elements, who, without forswearing their local attachments, can review the world in universal terms: the tutors, the humanists, the religious, the traders and manufacturers, the scientists and intellectuals, the military bred beneath the flags of grand alliances and fear of the nuclear bomb. Many communists will themselves reevaluate their position and enter the new mobilization of idea-forces.
The religious establishments of the world present a similar problem and solution. Communism's flat contradiction of spiritualism and religiousness, along with all organized religious, has been a costly and irrational error. There are potential obstacles in religion, as we have known it, to Kalotic cosmarchy. Still, there are valuable kalotic components within religion. The two elements need to be distinguished.
We believe that god, like nature, like existence itself, is impartial and non-discriminatory, whereas the Judaic, Christian, and Muslim religions cling in large part to the creed of a God who chooses and favors some kinds of people beyond others.
No man should speak for any people except his parishioners if he holds his first allegiance to be a ritual or a religious institution; he must not try to determine policies for others unless he is free to accept others policies and to think through the minds of others.
Inertial forces of wealth dominate religious enclaves throughout the world. Everyone must distinguish the earthly possessions of churches and parishioners from their spiritual goods.
There is a non-kalotic "time sense" in a number of religions; if only eternity matters, obviously a church preaching eternity as the place where problems are solved must act only as a supplement, not as a driving force, of revolution.
It is unlikely, if these five matters are understood, that the Kalotic Revolution will suffer the terrible confrontations experienced between communism and religion. But finally, the Revolution is spiritual and religious in essence. There is no fundamental quarrel between the Kalotic Revolution and religion. This kind of pneumos will be more closely explained at the conclusion of our work.
Much besides religion and nationalism has plagued historical attempts at world order. The functioning of charisma is another disabling factor. Charismatic rule as the basis for enduring megarchy is uncontrollable, nondurable, and in any case unjust in principle. Leaders are required in revolutions, but excessive reliance upon their personal qualities, as with Ahknaton, Alexander, J.Caesar, Mohammed, Napoleon, Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Tse-Tung invariably trades a short-run advantage for high risks and a chaos of succession. The populations involved are unconditioned for a rule of law and continuous institutions.
It is not worthwhile to except any leader from the bonds of principle: the cult of personality will thereupon destroy the principle. Two rules for kalotic leadership are: Do not follow a leader unless the men around him are equally worth following. And, do not follow a leader who lacks a logically consistent program; there must exist an objective frame of reference and within it a set of referrents. Other necessary restraints on leadership are in the system of Kalotic Revolution and of kalocracy itself.
Historical megarchies have failed to transform their violence into their professed basic principles. A struggle necessarily forces its means upon its ends. The more that the practices used to win power deviate from the practices proposed to follow victory, the less likely that these latter will be achieved, or even considered.
Hitler's empire was in this sense a near success, inasmuch as his end (the raping of the world for this conceived super-race) were well-attuned to his means. Communism has suffered gravely from the dilemma of violent means and egalitarian, peaceful ends. But its career has been common among visionary, humanitarian, and idealistic movements of violence. Now the Roman Empire was born in blood and its goal was forced tribute; its later benefactions were permitted by a long period of peace and a changing attitude towards the subjected populations.
Therefore, in creating the cosmarchy, violence is to be used sparingly, by processes of decision resembling as closely as possible the proposed processes of ordinary decision in the order that will come, and by persons forming an integral part of the revolutionary cadres. The Roman Republic, the Swiss Federation, the early American constitutional period, and some of the nineteenth century European revolutions should be studied for ideas of appropriate rites for the dissolution and erasure of the procedures of political violence.
Because they have been generally exploitative, megarchies of the past have not foreseen and have postponed beyond the point of feasibility the introduction of representative government within and among their peoples. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, which ranks high among historical megarchies in its restraint and regard for its people, failed to act early enough to create a representative political union. Metternich, who is assiduously studied, often is treated with a respect and admiration that he does not deserve; he is a paragon of vices for the establishment of a megarchy. Stalin performed the same bitter services for the Soviet Union.
The examples of the United States in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Italy, Germany, Japan, Korea, and South Vietnam, when in the chaos of violence and social change serious projections of representative self-government were launched, are to be carefully considered. The British, even dilatory toward their English speaking commonwealth nations, early acquired a contempt of the ability of non-British peoples to establish their own representative government; too late, they changed policies.
These refer to only one portion of the representative principle, that pertaining to internal governance of distinct elements. Regarding the most important element -- the creation of a representative government for the megarchy by consent of the elements -- almost no true examples exist. Weak confederations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, the medieval Swiss cantonal confederation, the Balkan confederation, and the ancient Amphyctyonic Council, come to mind. Of weak federations, there occur as examples the Iroquois Confederation of the 17th and 18th centuries, the government of the United States under Articles of Confederation, and the later Swiss federation. The United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the United States provide instances of integrated representative governments, not to be considered empires and unfortunately consisting almost entirely of mono -- cultured peoples.
Historically megarchies have been unable fully to use their domestic differentiation of fractions, that is, their internal vertical stratification, as an instrument for international expansion. The Arab world would not integrate politically its Jews and Christians, nor the Ottoman Empire its Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, and Lebanese, nor the U.S.A. its ethnic components. In each case, however, exceptional successes can be recorded: the Coptic Christians in Egypt, the Greek officials in the Ottoman Empire and the highly trained converted Christians of the Imperial Seraglio School, the absorption and employment of foreign-born to a modest degree in the American overseas services.
The major reason why such resources available for expansion and integration have been underemployed has been the hostile attitudes of the most aggressive elements of the expanding center--usually the military and the bureaucracy.
Additional noteworthy exceptions are to be found in the Venetian, Dutch and British Empires, where the expanding aggressive elements were kept by a favourable domestic situation and by the official acceptance of an ideology of laissez-faire from attacking the economic expansionists, the businessmen. Furthermore, the related freedom of association found in plutocracies encouraged simultaneously the creation of international voluntary societies-- missionary, scientific, educational, fraternal, and eleemosynary --- which, operating autonomously, helped to tie together the components of empire.
Beginning in the seventh century, the battle arrays of Islam saw religious as well as tribal sheikhs at the forefront, and Ibn Khaldun, seven hundred years later and in exile from his native Spain, wrote that "the Arabs are incapable of founding an empire unless imbued with religious fervor by a prophet or a saint." The Portuguese and early French and Spanish empires also profited from a collaboration of nationalistic and religious elements. Of the religious groups, the Jesuit order was especially prominent; it was a powerful arm of the warrior and political classes who were building the empire.
Never have the technically advanced countries been so internally differentiated as they are today. Megarchic operations need more than ever to be construed alongside, and if at all possible, in conjunction with the major political power thrusts. Trade, science, education, ideologies, culture, and friendships-- all formed in harmony with cosmarchic beliefs and policies-- must accompany the outward movement from the centers of force.7
The most frequently encountered reason for the destruction of empires is their failure to command and organize resources sufficient to put down external enemies. The Romans had finally to constrict their boundaries to thicken their defenses; the Turks failed at the gates of Vienna; the Muslim gave way before the arms of Catholic Spain and surrendered their last place in Western Europe. Neither Napoleon not Hitler could overwhelm the Russians at Moscow. Mussolini's imperial arms possessed neither the resources nor morale for what was asked of them. The French government believed it could not maintain the costs of holding its Algerian and Indochinese possessions.
But the French actions reveal a typical ambiguity in the causes of the decline of megarchies. The decline or break-up of empires is often not a simple matter of the appearance of a hitherto unknown and untested external enemy. The Amer-Indians in the face of the Spaniards,8 the Malay princes with the Dutch, the Indian Maharajahs with various European forces, and the Chinese Emperors in the Opium War with the British are cases of this simpler encounter of technologically disparate powers, the weaker becoming the empire in defeat. The French defeats were, first of all, resignations, that is, a drastic lowering of the level of resources that they chose to make available for the maintenance of Greater France. And so it was with the English in the West Indies, Africa, and elsewhere, and with the Dutch in Indonesia.
Guerrilla warfare is ancient (the Romans faced it in Scotland and Palestine), but it is coming back into fashion, and the holding of a country in any useful way is impossible against a partisan force that is popularly supported unless methods highly offensive to world opinion are employed. The Soviet Union discovered so in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States in Vietnam.
Other megarchies have existed and exist now, that have operated according to a functional or consensual principle without imperial force. These include, in the first category, hierarchic, friendly, or primitive orders where peoples for various reasons lack the impulse for aggressive expansion; these may range from traditional trading customs between two primitive tribes; areas simply of "friendly relations" as in Scandanavia; or areas of "dormant volcanoes whose sides are smiling vineyards" such as the North American continent. Indeed many of the world's frontiers are in megarchies of indifference or comity; no one is agitated over them.
In another category, more sophisticated, more planned, there occurs a community of ideas, training, trade, and interdependent economic systems which springs up under the patronage of both plutocratic and dystrocratic powers. These have sponsored a kind of international juridical order which continues to exist wherever the patronage of independent governments permits.
Of the United Nations in relation to megalorders, let only this be said: From the top down it is organized in a manner to restrain important decisions on behalf of world order; it is adapted to solutions of smaller problems of the type that unilateral actions and treaties have frequently achieved. Thus its image is greatly misleading and, far from bringing consensus (outside its own offices), it breeds disillusionment, providing every so often the sight of a big leap and a helpless fall. It belongs in the category of the weak confederation, with however the unusual and important consideration that it embraces enemies as well as allies. Such an acrobatic feat, marvellous in itself, still leaves the situation where it began: there is no hope for an internal settlement of the major problems of world order. It is a sideshow that should be moved away from the center of attraction if even an active cosmarchy is to be set up.9
If all adverse factors were taken into account and the positive principles associated with them were embraced, a megalorder would have no limit; mankind might be united. This would be a great good, of course, only it the operation and consequences of the cosmarchy would be good. To those principles that lend themselves to the construction of a cosmarchy must be added the elements of kalocracy, for these are the primary justification for exerting oneself to promote world order. Thus far they have been described as a rule which, by the year 50, would provide a basic subsistence for everyone, an increasing equality of opportunity, a rule of law, and an open spiritual life.
In their absence, or whenever it appears reasonably certain that a megalorder is achieving partial or total success and is not producing these goods, then it should be opposed. Because of their failure, both domestically and in their international relations, to lead to these benefits the regimes hitherto referred to--that is, dystrocracy, stratocracy, taxocracy, and plutocracy-- are to be rejected, diverted, turned around, and transformed.
All men have experienced world order of some kind. No significant part of humanity has escaped the thoughts and feelings of participating in a unity larger than the identity it enjoys with its territorial group. Even more promising than this fact is the fact that sentiments for cosmarchy today are distributed in disproportionately great strength among the elites of every type of regime, even where the regime as such as fundamentally or temporarily hostile to extended identifications.
United States history, for example, is pervaded by megarchic experiences. The doctrine of egalitarian liberalism has been present since the seventeenth century in America; it recognizes no distinction of blood and soil. The French revolutionary idea of fraternity is already present in the primitive Christian brotherhood which has been espoused and often practiced among many Americans. The territorial imperialism-- basically the desire to plant one's feet upon foreign or contested ground and remain there-- has not been absent, as the American Indians, the Mexicans, and various island peoples can attest.
The extension of the economic megalarchy by free trade is a prominent part of U.S. history, tying together in spirit the swift Yankee clippers of 150 years ago with the great air fleets to today. The total non-continental shipping and travel controlled by the U.S.A. today on land, sea, and air amounts to half of that of the whole world, and many carriage agencies not controlled by the U.S.A. are sustained only by the American goods and citizens whom they transport. The religio-missionary-fraternal-Americans have been as active in the eleemosynary megarchy as even the Roman Catholic Church (to which American citizens and resources contribute heavily) has been.
The United States participates, and has from its origins done so, in hundreds of international organizations, rule-formulative conferences, and thousands of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral. The organizations have often possessed a representative structure. No one has yet systematized the variety of procedure and devices used to represent differently various territorial, functional, and ideological interests in these organizations, but it is certain that the ultimate form of cosmarchy will have parallels, if not genesis, in these forms.
To all of these experiences with megalarchy must be added the continuous experience of the U.S.A. with confederational and federational systems within its continental confines: representative conglomerates of early settlements, Articles of Confederation, the Confederate States, and the United States under the Constitution itself, which is the longest continuous federation of any importance in world history. Thus the United States is neither young nor inexperienced in the full range of megalarchic instrumentation.
The rich similar experiences of the European states and the somewhat less varied international history of the South American, Muslim, and Indian peoples can be likewise adduced. What, however, can the giant nations of Communist China and the Soviet Union provide in the same regard? China, it must be admitted, has a limited international history. Although it has extended its population and culture massively from ancient times,10 China has been left unprepared by history to deal with the complexities and decision-making apparatus of a cosmarchy. It pursues a simple suppressive expansionism, such as has been seen in Tibet. An exception is the Nationalist Chinese of Formosa, who have developed a veritable simian agility in the jungles of world politics. A more classical exception is the free-trade economic expansionism of the overseas Chinese, who should be shepherded by the Kalotic Revolution, if for no other reason then because they constitute a great potential leavening force in the rigid practices of mainland Chinese foreign policies.
The Soviet Union is another matter. It has, to be sure, a core of Russianism that is profound and resistant to cosmopolitanism as much as the Chinese, and given its more passive psychology, perhaps less adaptable to a loose and liberal world situation. Yet the westernization of Russian thought that was encouraged by certain historical regimes, the affinity of Russians with other Slavic peoples on a semi-equal basis, noteworthy in various pan-Slavic movements, the strong Marxist conviction that the working classes of the world must have identical problems and outlook, the proto-federal nature of the Soviet Constitution, and the recent experiences of Soviet officials in international organizations, all place the perspective and flexibility of the Soviet nation midway between the Euro-Americans and the Chinese. If once the Soviet taxocracy were to admit the idea that Russians might act abroad in an independent or associated, though non-official, capacity, the positioning of the Soviet Union with respect to the next large moves towards cosmarchy would be much more favorable. There is little movement towards this concept, however, and the building of a second force within the Soviet Union has to proceed for some time in an atmosphere of repression and martyrdom.
Just as some experience with megalarchy is universally present, the opportunity to constitute a megalorder is always present.11 Never has there been a time in history when a megarchy of some kind was not in process of formation. Scarcely had the Roman Empire in the West fallen, when the Byzantine, Frankish, Arab, Roman, and Holy Roman Empires began to take shape. At the same time empires existed or were forming in South and Central America and South Asia. The American megalarchy formed on the heels of the failing European megalarchy, and the Soviet megarchy grew with the destruction of the Nazi Third Reich.
The critical questions are whether a kalotic megalarchy is possible at this time and where it should begin. A beneficent cosmarchy can be attempted now if it is agreed that most people of the greater part of the world are ready to accept it. This they do.
A kalocracy is possible if a principled, devoted, and persistent minority of politically and functionally skilled persons exist to carry it forward. They must be psychologically prepared to assume risks: the unknown must be wrestled with, not evaded. These may exist.
A conglomerate of interests and policies must be arranged that will provide the peoples of the world with a reasonable expectation of early benefits on the revolution towards cosmarchy. These have been formulated and are adequate.
The revolution has to be controlled as to violence and adherence to principles. This is difficult, even though the forces opposing Kalotic Revolution at this moment are probably weaker than at any time since World War II, If at some time in the future it would be predictable that the price of kalocracy is a war of the dimensions of World War II or worse, then, except in self-defense, the movement should be slowed and restricted. Self-defense has to be carefully limited to attempts at physical extermination of the movement, locally in local cases, internationally otherwise.
| 1. | H. D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, and among many studies, Geoffrey Gorer's Great Russians, where childrens' school-books teaching hatred of America are quoted. |
| 2. | Warren Wager's The City of Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963) brings together the contrasting writings of the megarchists of recent times. He concludes the "inevitability" of a "completely viable world civilization." (p. 7.) |
| 2a. | Cf. e.g., Schurman and Schell, The China Reader, Vol. I, p. 104. " The Emperor's Decree to the Outer Barbarians " |
| 3. | George Codes, The Indianized State of Southeast Asia (1944; Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press, 1968). On Chinese imperialism in Central Asia, see Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). |
| 4. | Mario Attilio Levi, Political Power in the Ancient World (New York: The New American Library, 1965) deals with the scope of this paragraph. |
| 5. | A comprehensive account of history up to about 1500 A. D. as " an internationally shared fund of multifarious human experience," especially stressing peace and order, is presented by Adda B. Bozeman, in Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). See also, Peter Calvocoressi, World Order and New States (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962). |
| 6. | Cf. Robert Michels, Der Patriotismus (Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1929); Louis L. Snyder, ed., The Dynamics of Nationalism (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand 1964). |
| 7. | See Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., Economics and the Idea of Mankind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965). |
| 8. | Less than 2000 Spaniards reduced several Empires and many peoples to the stable rule of a foreign hierarchy within fifty years of the beginnings of their aggression. |
| 9. | Quincy Wright, in an important study, concludes, " Given the inertia of social institutions it is probable that the model most similar to the present system would be the most feasible. [N. B.: Given, which we do not give.] Those, however, who perceive disaster in the present system of power politics believe only a radical change of that system would pass the test of desirability." [That is us.] (On Predicting International Relations, the Year 2000, Denver: U. of Denver, 1969, p. 17.) Professor Wright, willy-nilly, ends as a liberal, for he accepts as given l) social intertia, and 2) the impossibility of " agreement on the hierarchy of desired values." (Ibid.) |
| 10. | Maria Penkala presents a thorough chronology and many maps of Chinese, as well as Indian and other domains, in A Correlated History of the Far East (1966; Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1968). |
| 11. | The Journal Daedalus, published a worthy set of articles on the Conditions of World Order, VC (Spring, 1966). |