Unless men are ready to give and receive love, they cannot freely give or receive anything properly. It is not that food, clothing, and sex are less immediate. But for people of the world to get and give these requires that others love them in an especially mature disinterested way. Love pervades the Kalotic balance. How it branches into considerateness and identification can be shown here. Kalocracy promotes considerate relations and represses destructiveness. How are these conditions implicated in the idea of Kalos? True, ancient law, both customary or common,and statutory, tends in their direction, so we sense that dikeos is evolving. The present world solicits a continuous attention to codifying and reforming the law with specific reference to them. Especially must Kalotic law prescribe the limits of group exclusiveness, to screen out any destructive and hostile creeds that may otherwise infect group doctrines. This is an important part of the principle of dikeos.
It includes, as a corollary, the suppression of the tendency to permit, domestically and internationally, hitherto abused groups and persons from pursuing an inconsiderate policy toward their former exploiters. Persons discriminated against and treated inconsiderately may not retaliate by adopting rejected attitudes. The spirit of some racist "Black Power" groups of the U.S.A., of anti-white Congolese, fo the anti-Dutch Indonesians, or anti-European Algerians of the anti-Turkish Greeks, or anti-landlord Chinese, and of other lesser or greater largely destructive movements, may originate in reprehensible social circumstances, but they cannot be whipped up to frenzies and regarded benevolently, lest the whole Kalotic movement be endangered; for everyone, all of us, have grounds for portraying ourselves as pathetic and persecuted, and therefore tempted to hate, aggress, and destroy. There is no hope for the world until those who control and shape their hostilities in Kalotic ways control those who cannot do so.1
The United Nations, which has been losing its reputation for lawfulness by its tolerance and even encouragement of ethnic and economic revenge, must come under discipline in this regard. The New Testament is generally right in asking an offended person to "turn the other cheek" the new morality says that "turning the other cheek" means supra-revenge. We say, "To let history punish the guilty and to make the guilty punish themselves, seek a new situation in which the first offense cannot be repeated". Build Kalos, that is.
Let us stress how the positive side of suppression of hate expresses itself in love. A strange feature of many theologies and philosophies is their superficial attitude towards affection. They thought generally that love was a secondary rational sentiment, except in the case of mother-love. They were far from understanding one truth as a great number of psychological investigations of the 20th century have discovered it: Man needs to give and receive affection almost as much as he does to eat, though the need is expressed in many different modes, just as the eyes and ears receive and describe what is received as an undifferentiated neural sensation. "The power of love, as the basis of a state, has never been tried."13
The need for affection emerges naturally from the instinct of man that seeks security. Giving affection lends security as much as giving food does. Receiving affection is equally comforting. It is therefore part of emos. Man is social animal says Aristotle, who means that man fundamentally and by nature is a social lover.
All theology has not missed the point: "Better to give than to receive." Charity does more for the donor than the recipient. A lack of affection, whether in the family or society, fosters human hostilities in a vicious circle. The rejected person becomes unhappy and resentful. He in turn rebuffs and hurts others. And they retaliate. From individual relations to relations between whole peoples, this principle of hostility holds.
Affection, self-respect, charity, and human dignity-the cluster of important desired relations and personal traits give us equal consideration, which is fundamental to dikeos. But equal consideration has to do also with the adjustment of experience. New experience (pneumos) is to be gained without denying equal consideration to those who are affected by change. The principle of change is to be considerate even when adamant.
How is to be done? By insisting upon equal opportunities to achieve goals in life, for self-fulfillment. As man or woman moves up and down, in and out, in geographical space and social strata, he or she should be able to rely upon a high degree of equality of consideration in relation to all other persons reaching for the same goals.
He should, however, not be catered to when he demands absolute equality, regardless of all social differences. Dikeos is limited by both emos and pneumos. They are a troika. There is no way of guaranteeing absolute equality, even if it could be conceived of. To do so would place everybody in imminent danger of losing everything he has-money, property, job, house, wife, recreation, and so on, for absolute equality means that the next set of anybody's behavior may as likely as not place him in the shoes of somebody else. A rich man today may literally be a poor man tomorrow, a wife a divorcee, a scholar a bum, a soldier a scientist, and so on. Life would be a 360ø lottery. Equality in the absolute mechanical sense is intolerable, impossible, and anyway unjust.
The time sense in which equality should be taken as a basis for social policy is in the sense of "equal consideration" -- that is, all persons require, deserve, and receive sober, respectful, and equal attention to their wants, given the necessary discriminations arising out of the need for "getting a job done".
In this sense equality is present when there is a rule of law (dikeos), that is, when every person may expect that authority and rules under which he must live are made known to him and will be enforced upon him substantially in the same manner as upon everyone else.
Equality is substantively present when the chances of every child at birth to receive affection, sustenance, and education are equal (pneumos). Similarly no person of any age or standing is dismissed from consideration as to the possibility of a socially and individually beneficial change in his character or prospects. Self-fulfillment is the essence of pneumos.
That each man has something of value to give, and is offering it, and is voluntarily participating in such transactions is a fundamental myth of the Kalotic trilogy. Demands for help are predicated upon demands to help. "World equality of income," "westernization," and other slogans move restless peoples all over the world; they are unifying but crisis-provoking. As Lasswell says: "Shall we use the slogan `World Equality of Income' and seek to equate the gifts of nature to the pacific Islanders with the complex claims of the Western European worker for material and psychological income?"4 Thus impossible claims are forged. A false sense of unity, a destructive sense of unity, is created. The kalotic formula to solve the problem of unification without abetting destructiveness consists of five propositions:
1. Each should be what he is.
2. Each group has demands to be more of what it is.
3. These specific cultural demands should be converted into international exchange.
4. Only the most harmful demands should be `denied currency', such as cannibalism, unrestrained births, racism, sexism, etc.
5. Then the world order should permit the distribution to each of its own.
One large reason why attempts to set the moral direction of a society have failed is that the proponent is urging a single moral system on everyone. Instead we should provide a single typical Kalotic system to which social policy should address itself and which many or most people should use to orient themselves. Other moral patterns or systems can rotate, interlock and even conflict with the main system, provided the requisite momentum of the main system is kept.
We may choose an example, long adopted by criminologists and penal reformers, which can be extended into the total realm of moral choices: punishment for crime should begin with the examination of an offender; then the punishment should consists of what will change him best and most. otherwise, we will err in believing that the same punishment will affect all offenders in the same way, which is the primitive and revengeful presumption of ancient law. Punishment should fit the criminal, if it is really to fit the crime. Kalos, too, should suit the person, and each and every group in the 360ø of social circumference should have its specific kalotic formula.
The principles of Kalotic (emotic) identification are three in number.
1. The chances are equal that any person chosen at random from the population is as lovable as the average of one's neighbors.
2. The claim to any portion of one's property or attention is no more possessed by one's neighbors than by any other person chosen at random from anywhere.
3. The allegiance to kalotic principles supersedes allegiance to any institution, from the family to the world state.
Whether such principles can be inculcated in man generally depends upon man's innate capacities for sympathy with his fellowmen regardless of surface differences and inevitable conflicts. "I am a citizen of the world, I am a citizen of Weimar," said Wolfgang Goethe.5 Men and women sympathize out of the cosmic sense that they share, by the spectacular divine views presented to their senses-in nature, in the sky, in the earth, in life.6
They sympathize because they obviously often depend directly upon one another, as members of a symbiotic family. That most families have strong bonds of affinity and mutual aid is true and desirable. But too much has been made of the family as an obstacle to megarchy and altruism. It is especially true of modernized society but always true to a high degree that a love for mankind can begin in the family, just as can a fear and hatred of man. Jesus always loved, but then left, his family on his life's mission, deliberately choosing the sacrifice of personal bonds. Not a day passes but that millions of the young take to the outer world. This is the tendency of nature; the love or hate that a person carries with him is the product in large part of the family and the struggle for universal altruism begins in the early home. In itself, like any other group such as the nation, the family does not fight against a kalotic world but can even bask in its promise.
People sympathize also when they feel that they are "in the same boat", at work, in crowds, in the cinema. They share thoughts and ideas; they feel pity. There is unquestionably a ground in the psychology of man for cooperation on a local or world plane. But this ground has to be intensively and scientifically cultivated.
Up to now no affectional ties among peoples are so strong as invariably to impede destructive conflict; still no ties are so weak as to preclude substantial cooperation. Immediately preceding and often immediately after fratricidal civil war and destructive warfare, one discovers period of fine cooperation, with extensive sympathy among the parties involved. Thus, the extraordinary industrial harmony of America in the 1940's and 1950's followed bitter warfare between labor and management of the 1930's. European cooperation has for twenty-five years highlighted the tragedy of the total warfare of 1940-5.
The rupture of affection and ties often owes more, at least at the start, to a shift within one or more elites than to disturbance of mass attitudes. That is, hostile remedies are seized upon in the name of the one toparchy by a leadership that is psychologically composed towards greater conflict and destruction, pushing into the background those less disposed to conflict who had dominated before. No more tragic a case is to be found than occurred in Germany between 1932 and 1933, when the Nazis replaced and destroyed an internationalist leadership.
The blatant sale of affection and brotherly love, however, especially through special institutions and propaganda agencies, is usually an error. A negative reaction is provoked, either from defiance and resentment or because people subconsciously recognize the positive function that hostilities and conflicts, organized into their characters, perform. Then frustration and disappointment overcome the reformers. Conflict has to be accepted and arranged for in the social system. People who appear to be completely identified with one another, rare as they are, will still exhibit destructive intro-group and intra-self conflicts. We have conflicts within ourselves-one part of ourselves disliking another part. Frequently this causes destruction in the personality, mental illness, self-destructiveness, uselessness, and listlessness. It also stimulates activity of a benevolent and creative kind, the performance of distasteful obligations, and other useful missions.
Furthermore, so long as a group attempts to sell affinity at the same time that it is organized for an exclusive existence, through an independent culture, language, tradition, or other traits, its propaganda becomes suspect. "A regime of one language and one custom is imbecilic and fragile."7 Because then it is really asking too much. It can plead for peace and cooperation on a rational level but certainly not for full identification and affinity.
Toparchy and cosmarchy require strong barriers against destructive behavior, against force, against making domineering demands of other people. Stress on both considerateness and expediency should reinforce the barriers. People should have a respect for human life, to the point of abolishing capital punishment and continuously reducing military provocations. Taking life is a habit which, like most habits, if pampered will become more engrossing.
If all the capabilities of human beings in the world for affection were properly employed, there would be little question that one could have a flourishing world order. Only a minority of people are congenitally, through training, or through the distortion and disruption of their personalities, aggressively destructive.
By the same token it is almost impossible to expect to find characters in the world of a type who are so completely identified with other persons to the extent that conflict between the two becomes unbearable. It is unbearable to think that Canada and England will ever go to war because they are so culturally and historically intertwined; yet as a matter of fact it is quite conceivable that they might through a third party, through entangling alliances, through a split in the ruling class in Canada, and so on. No practice of mankind but can be reversed, practically and morally. Wherefore Kalotic leadership is needed continuously. Mo-Ti said 2500 years ago: "As to universal love and mutual aid, they are beneficial and easy beyond a doubt... the only trouble is the absence of a superior who encourages them"
Persons generally need to belong to one or more image groups and these are self-image groups, people to whom they join their minds and spirits, groups through whom they perceive the outer world. And if persons are not part of an image group, as for example persons, who do not perceive themselves to be part of all humanity, the job of persuading them to take on a new image of themselves as part of humanity, and of humanity as part of themselves, becomes a job of pneumic propaganda very much like any other such job.
It is not an easy task. People tend to be happy with groups in their own image, and are jolted rudely when told that they have new relatives to worry about. And supposing, as is likely, that 80% of all the people in the world are satisfied with their own ego or image groups as they stand and have no desire to switch their identification to a world group or a revolutionary movement, then creating another image group may be difficult indeed. The best tactic of course is to concentrate upon the 20% who have more flexible egos, hoping to find most Kalotic tutors of the world among them.
Even this 20% who share an image of cosmarchy may be rendered vulnerable to political defeat; as Kalotic policies begin to conflict with the interests of other image groups, especially local ones, competing elites will arise that claim to have a set of superior world and local policies. Although the alternative may not be a logical one, since they may not be able readily to reconcile local interests and world interests, they can count upon the tendency of people to permit cognitive dissonance, that is, misperceptions if these misperceptions seem functional.
Thus the person who appeals logically to a group on grounds of their world affiliation and tells them at the same time that they will be deprived to some extent in their local affiliations because of the needs of this larger affiliation is likely to come off second-best in a contest with a person who illogically and through any kind of verbal or semantic barbarism tells people that he can give them both their identification with the world at large and serve local interests. The "anti-other demagogue" is a mental bandit into whose hands nature has placed a pistol.
This is a serious threat, one that will come up constantly in an evolving world order. It is one reason why demands for world order should be as limited in their scope as possible without sacrificing radicality. They should be minimal in the specificity with which they confront local interests also; the less the sacrifice demanded in the name of the world image as opposed to other images, the less strong the conflict with the local image will be. The greater the ratio of image-intensity to political demands in its name, too, the more power held in reserve.
Whenever revolution has been proposed, two challenges have been rightly offered to it. How, it is asked, do you legitimate your objectives? How, secondly, do you deal with the problem of obedience to authority? (This last is more poignant, because revolutions notoriously foster disobedience of all conventional authority; who will then obey the new authority?)
We have elaborated the positive side of obedience to authority at some length, here and elsewhere: when men agree upon goals, they in the largest sense obey each other; when men decide upon a new standard of legitimacy, they obey its guidelines. Once the Kalotic Movement has been launched, the mysteries of legitimacy will embrace it. Then, some of the spiritual, personalist, rationalist, traditionalist, forceful factors that persuade men of the legitimacy of a rule, will begin to strengthen Kalotic formulas and rule.
The question of obedience to authority will cause anxiety in two types of cases. One is that narrow band of cases of people who are psychotically unable to "obey". These are the ungovernable revolutionaries. With regard to the larger number of problems in obeying, the Kalotic Movement and Kalocracy prove their own worth by the way in which they cope with them.
Man, if he agrees with an objective of a group, should obey because cooperation is required in many tasks, large and small. The organization of cooperation cannot be achieved without leadership. The leadership has to be accredited; it has to give clues, both positive and negative to the group; it must offer a program and administer rewards; it must administer penalties and deprivations as well.
These "clues" of leadership may be challenged as "incorrect." In such cases, dissent is to be invited, but the leadership must be allowed to continue until the discovery of correct clues is made. Leaders, to show good faith, must give acceptable evidence that they are employing seriously the best known scientific methods of achieving a correct policy. If they do not do so, then they are disqualified to receive obedience.
If the priority or value of their actions is challenged, then they must run the gauntlet of change. They must submit to elections, adjudication, petition, referendum and all other means of promptly altering their course. If the means are not prompt and adequate to the need, then improvised and unconventional means-stressed democracy-may be employed. Challenges may be abusive, whenever they lack an inherent clear corrective value.
The general euphoria that comes from a well-followed leadership is a social good not to be denied; it is part of the euphoria of consensus and authority. Kalists should never scruple, however, to bring down an ineffectual or bad regime.
The Kalotic Revolution can work on these asserted principles (defying all who say man can only move under drugs and the lash) because of its inherent nature. It relies heavily upon intelligence (in both the G2 and IQ sense), upon the accumulated and unused capacities of science, and upon a large category of the population, the Tutors, larger than any that has made a great revolution in history.
Social conditions are propitious, too, for Kalos. The new consensus can be adopted because the old consensuses no longer exist as tight bodies of directives to large bodies of the faithful. One must ask men and women as individuals to perform kalotic acts and then say whether their culture would let them or not let them perform the acts. On agit, et depuis on voit. First act and then see what happens.
Everywhere in the plutocratic and taxocratic world, the old consensus and authority are in decline. Daniel Bells has declared The End of Ideology,8 by which he means a slackening of mass moral indignation over "leftist" formulas for new societies, and the thesis may be accepted. But there is a thrashing of limbs and a grinding of teeth in the sleeping mass; they portend a rising, a revolt, and perforce a belief-system-it will perhaps be muddled, but let it be our muddle.
Whether in the Soviet Union or in the U.S.A. a disenchantment with the social order is manifest, especially among the youth. Evasion, escape, malingering, and revolt affect both the state social institutions. There is so little active interest in the world order as to refute those who used to say that without a cosmarchy there would be world war. The empty pantries of the united Nations are playrooms of dystrocrats away from home. From the family to the world community there is a falling off of consensus.
There are similar grave schisms within each culture on beliefs in the sources of truth, methods by which truth is conveyed, how authority is legitimated, demands as to who shall make sacrifices for the common good, beliefs as to who should be in command of the society and who are the symbolic leaders of the society; there are as many critical schisms on these points within any given culture today as there are between any two major cultures separated territorially.
Men sharing the same culture will discover that they are differently inclined to work on behalf of a world order, as differently as two men of different cultures. It may be just as easy, all other things being equal, to cooperate with the Hindu or Buddhist or communist on behalf of world order as it would be to cooperate with the man who lives next door. Centuries ago, Mohamed Rumi said,
By loving wisdom doth the soul know life; What has it got to do with senseless strife of Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Arab, Turk?
Within any given culture exists a variety of personality types and a variety of attitudes. Yet no culture can hold out against consmarchy, nor is any culture apparently superior in its ability to recompose itself for a world order. Solutions of world order are not to be conceived of as culturally predetermined; they are truly matters of program, elite, organization, and movement.
In its search for a minimum morality of large importance, the cosmarchy should discount matters of parochial significance, provided only that persons who cannot endure the parochial morality have ample opportunity to avoid and leave it. The world order should not undertake everything; it must ensure some kind of minimum. In creating a world order, we elicit from the cultures as they are those elements which are capable of recognizing the world, and reorganize to that extent the existence of people within their own culture.
It is demonstrably false that "east is east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet." The task is rather to have the `good' meet than the `bad' that so often happens. Nor is all change of cultures impossible to control, any more than personal change is. Of cultures, as of individuals, it has been argued, "Today I am, what I am and if I were not what I am, I would be something else, but being what I am how can I be different tomorrow?" The fact is that, whether by predetermination or by free will, the seeds of change do sprout: cultures do change, peoples do change, and doctrines do change, sometimes with surprising rapidity, and it is the gardener who knows how to weed, and the geneticist who knows how to breed, that are important to the Kalotic Revolution. Declared one physicist recently, world community "will one day lie... in a common delight in the progress of the intelligence of man."9
| 1. | J.K. Zawodny presents a great range of contributions to the understanding of hostility and integration in persons and groups: Man and International Relations, 2 vols. (San Francisco: Chandler, 1966). |
| 2. | See Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate (London: Kegan, Paul, 1938). |
| 3. | R.W. Emerson, "Politics" in Works, Vol, I,p. 380. |
| 4. | World Politics and Personal Insecurity p. 187. We need not only the "rites of passage" in moving from one age group to another, but also horizontally to rehearse the new demands and obligations in moving from one society or occupation to another so as to prevent "culture shock" and maladjustment. |
| 5. | Xenien, V (1796). Cf. Lloyd Free and H. Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967); and Alfred Hero, Americans in World Affairs (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959). |
| 6. | Cf. J.A.M. Meerloo, "Why Do We Sympathize with Each Other," 15 Archives of General Psychiatry (1966), p. 390. |
| 7. | Stephen of Hungary in a Monita to his heir: "Unius linguae uniusque moris regnum imebcile et fragile est." Quoted in Wilhelm Ropke, A Humane Economy (Chicago: Regnery, 1960). |
| 8. | The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1965). |
| 9. | Philip Morrison, in F.J. Crosson, ed., Science and Contemporary Society (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 241. |