Let us go down to the depths of systematic violence and see what we find there. The joys of war include loot, parcelled out individually and gathered collectively. The potential Tutors have erratically conveyed the world to the stage where individual loot will shortly be untempting. A nation that robs another nation's industry soon has only an outmoded industry, without replacement parts. A soldier who loots food, clothing. and bric-a-brac must soon be rare, if the early Kalotic policies for universal emos are carried out.
The joys of war include rape or at least romantic excitement. Soldiers commit actions that are repressed at home. But what place can there be for such savagery in societies where personal relations are freer. The joys of war include punishing, killing, and destructiveness. But the reformed family and the opportunities of Kalotic life reduce these urges and combine with the remoteness and abstractness of modern war like a giant nutcracker to crush this aberrant pleasure. The same benevolent and open institutions of Kalocracy reduce the urges to exercise sheer power and enjoy sheer submission. this is the revolution of dikeos in personality and society.
War appears in the guise of a great inventor. "War is the father of all," wrote Heraclitus, the philosopher of the universe as flux. And scholars have prepared lists of the fruits of research into war;1 this is an immensely expensive way of designing creative research; it is like burning down a house to roast a pig. But, besides that, it is a dreadful recollection of ancient human sacrifices intended to produce miraculous weapons against an enemy.
War seems glorious and is exhilerating too because many people see, mobilized and acting terribly towards others, the same forces that they have so often feared were disposed to act terribly towards themselves. The doubts about the benignity of one's own groups are resolved as they discharge their venom upon others.
In the end, the benefits of war become a delusion for the people who desire it and engage in it, except for the most atavistic, degraded, and dispossessed parts of a population. It can persist only so long as the ruling classes propagate the delusion. The Tutors, who have already made war joyless, can now insure, by taking power, that the delusion of the joys of war cannot possess the holders of power or the media of mass communication.
The joys offered by the Kalotic Revolution are far more real, substantially effective, and permanently rewarding. There is the joy of seeing the world calm itself, regulate its growth pains, and nurture itself. There is joy in breaking down thousands of hostile and costly boundaries within and among the toparchies of the world. There is joy in the camaraderie of the thousands of small autonomous groups of the kalotic movement. There is joy in revising old liberties and developing new ones. The kalotic alternative, the life of kalos, is the ultimate weapon against war.
Man never did learn to live well in the country. Rural happiness is a myth, an historical lie. He has not yet learned to live in the city. The kalotic mastery of rurality and the metropolis are for the future. Today we stand witness to a universal rural revolt on the heels of the depopulation of rural areas.
In every country a phenomenon is observable: the village and country population is surging into the cities. At the same time, a political doctrine is spread in many places to the effect that a revolution in the jungles, tundra, and mountains will be sweeping into the centres of society.
Revolts of the peasantry are old experiences of human societies.2 So are guerrilla wars.3 Both are common in history. Their incidence of failure is very high, but no more so than that of urban insurrections generally.
Sometimes ruralists have triumphed as an international force, as invasion of barbarians from the outside. The collapse of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom around 1500 B.C. under natural catastrophes led to conquest by the wild Hyksos out of Arabia who ruled for centuries until destroyed by Egyptian and Hebrew armies.4 Numerous similar rural onslaughts are listed in ancient annals. The taxocracy of the Roman Empire gave way to the pressures of Teutons from the North, with civilized, semi-civilized and finally fully barbaric tribes dealing more and more punishing blows to the political, legal, and social structure. The Huns in Europe, the early Muslim throughout the Mediterranean, and the Mongols in China and the Middle East, might be considered as rural conquerors of urban centres.
The Chinese Empire of the 19th century, which was a shaky taxocratic structure, perhaps to be considered more as a congeries of stratocracies (the War Lords), believed that its European invaders were barbarians. The difference was between the two forces of eqally sophisticated cultures and different technologies. But the Chinese of that time are not a lone example of a people who consider wide cultural differences as indications of their own civilization and other people's barbarism. There is much of this confusion of reality and illusion in international conflict and domestic inter-strata and rural-urban struggles.
Most cases of international disruptions of a social order are compounded by internal religious and factional conflicts. Roman contingents employed barbarians and they also allied with barbarians at different times and places against their own kind. So also were used the European forces working within the disintegrating Celestial Empire of China. And, considering now the socalled internal disputes in many places, it becomes apparent that civil war usually attracts, or is associated with, foreign intervention.
The theory of rural force descending upon the cities has been well propounded by Mao-Tse-Tung and his disciples. In 1936, Mao lectured his officers in Shensi:
A vast semi-colonial country that is unevenly developed politically and economically and that has gone through a great revolution; a powerful enemy; a weak and small Red Army; and the agrarian revolution-these are the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war. They determine the guiding line for China's nrevolutionary war and its strategic and tactical principles.5
Ultimate triumph and world involvements transformed necessity into a brilliant new image, thirty years later, here voiced by Mao's disciple, Lin Piao:
If we look at the world, North America and Europe are the cities. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the villages. The world revolution that is going to take place will eventually assume the form of the villages encircling the cities. World revolution will eventually be led by the revolutionary struggles of the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have the overwhelming majority of the world's population.6
The rural revolutionary concept purports to base itself upon Mao's experiences; but his was an urban movement, transported into the rural regions, just as the Soviets moved their people and industries out of reach of the Germans in World War II, and then moved back as the enemy collapsed. The theory is proclaimed by guerrillas everywhere. Declared Che Guevara,
In getting a foothold in the countryside, a guerrilla band that attaches itself to the peasant masses will grow from a minor to a major group, it will destroy the army in a head-on fight, and from the countryside will go on to take over the cities.7
The concept is not scientific but is more of a legend, which may be useful for building rebel morale but may also be a handicap to the strategy of revolution. And the legend may affect favourably or adversely all parties of a struggle.
The largest existing center of rural insurrectionary force stands in the upper reaches of the Mekong River and around the Shan Plateau, which impinges upon half a dozen nations and then into the island states of the South Pacific. This force has to be viewed in several ways: it is Chinese-supported; it is a rural migration to the cities that could occur and is occuring in peaceful form; it is communist-inspired; it is a demand for equal treatment served upon the governments of the plain; it is an antiimperialist episode; it is banditry; it is nationalistic; it is separatistic; it is sheer restlessness where arms are available, authority is vacant, and soldiering has prestige and brings as much profit as scraping a living from a destitute environment.8
The Cuban-Colombian-Venezuelan rural insurrectionary complex is similar. The Congo Basin, the mountainous frontiers of India, and the Western frontiers of China are modified versions of the same rural environment of revolutionary force. "After 6 years, Guerrilla War is a Fact of Life for Angolans" declares a New York Times reporter from Carmona (September 17, 1967), and the story might as well have been, written today. Others will come.9
A generation ago, revolutions were believed to arise in the cities, where the discontented, including the intellectuals, might easily conspire and where crowds assemble to storm the barricades.10 Such was the style from the French Revolution to the Fascist and Nazi Revolutions. The Russian Soviet Revolution began in the cities and engaged the remotest countrysides of that vast empire.
The success of the communist revolution in China, which marched from the provinces upon the cities, led the fashion setters of historical theory into the opposite view. They were now sure that revolutions would be made from the country. The cities would be cut off from their supplies. They would lose touch with their larger worlds. They would be demoralized. They would succumb.
Facts prove theories, not theories facts. As a rural revolution, the Viet Cong force will have been a success, no matter what its ultimate fate. The Malayan insurgency was a failure.11 When a revolution from the country survives and succeds, so be it. And if it rises in the cities, that is a fact too. In truth, a revoltuion is a holism. It succeeds (or fails) for many reasons, and from many causes. Its location is a dependent variable.
The Peronist and anti-Peron Argentinian Revolutions, and the Greek military revolution of 1967 invigorated in the cities and ended in the country. The Algerian, Cuban, and Chinese revolutions invigorated in the country and ended in the cities. The American Revolution sprang up in the cities and ended in the country. The Nazi Revolution in Germany was born and triumphed in the cities.
A revolution is born or aborts. It grows strong or withers. It succeeds or fails. If these are the phases (and it would be pedantic to be more precise about them) then any phase can occur in either city or country.
The application of this proposition is that a revolutionary battleground can be set up or defended wherever convenient to do so. The rules of revolutionary (and counter revolutionary) propaganda, however, require the claim that wherever one is, is the best place to be.
While the distractable press focuses upon the rural wars, the metropolis is temporarily igonored. However, events in the city will determine the future course of history. There are no longer any rural nations of great energy and new devices who will descend upon the metropolises. Nor does any great society have a politically charged situation between landlord and peasantry that can discharge into a new form of society.12 Modern communications, technology, and production are metropolitan in nature; the industrial city is not like the traditional city, which was primarily a great collection of bodies performing tasks and living lives not much dissimilar to those of their brethren of the rocks, crags, and jungles.13
As the modern city concentrates the energies of a country, it stresses also the need of a revolutionary element to dispose itself throughout the organism that it occupies. If it does not, it can be cordoned off and rendered completely defensive and short-lived, just as the rural insurrectionary force can go only a limited distance towards the metropolis.
Neither rural nor urban insurrectionary forces can do more than weaken a national society or alliance of states (a megarchy). If a series of reforms is desired, rather than to bring down a regime, then urban riots and insurrections can certainly win success. To go all the way they have to be supported by a well-developed domestic nation within a nation, or by outside powers themselves invulnerable for one reason or another to attack, or by a subversive apparatus entwined with the order that is under attack, or a combination of these.
As in every kind of contest, the forces must focus a sufficiency of usable resources on the spot. It is not enough that they are coincidentally sympathetic. The Castro regime, the American Black Power partisans, and Mekong River guerrillas would, if informed, gladly have sent fraternal greetings to the rioting students and striking workers who were hoping to topple the regime of General De Gaulle in France during May of 1968. But the General would not worry so much as if a single additional alley were barricaded, or ten policemen refused to attack. There was relevant significance in the refusal of 43 Negro soldiers to follow orders preliminary to being organized and sent to Chicago in August, 1968, where, they believed, they would be employed in force against largely Negro demonstrators at the Democratic Party Convention. A pervasive sharing of sympathies can erode the suppressing power, if the power seeks to employ outside forces that contain the sympathizers.
To determine then what ties together effectively these disparate revolutionary elements, one has to return to the conventional force of revolution. That is the fraction of the society itself. The fraction has to be immanent, prevading every toparchy, and transcendent, operating internationally as well as domestically, working to coordinate with all its kindred elements inside the toparchies. More than ever in history, largely, becuase of the technical nature of modern society, and because of the psychology and historical intelligence of modern man, a revolution has be immanent and transcendent in the corpus that it is reforming.
Conventional revolutionary theory called for a revolt of a territorial ethnic component, a displaced portion of the elite, a disgruntled military clique, an anti-imperialist, populace, a social class. These can be important, just as rural and urban guerrillas can be significant. But only a circumferential and diffused force can both bring down the existing order and create simultaneously the foundations of the new order.
A pervasive 360ø force is needed for the 360ø War: that is the meaning of the immanent and transcendental strategy. The general malaise of the world, the expectation of something universally new, finds its expression in disorders that are ridiculed for being without meaning, as if what they move against has meaning. But this malaise has to occupy the organs of the world and domestic society. It has to be positioned everywhere. Every tool of the complex culture of modern man has to be in the hands of questioners.
The questioners have to elaborate contempt for the multitude of automatons who man the existing regimes until every activity of modern life is slowed down or even stopped out of uncertainty. But it is crucial to bring modern world society to this point throughout the farthest reaches simultaneously, or more specifically, without such a spasmodic collapse as to give over the revolution to its enemies. Wherever giant powers conflict, both sides must be brought down. Modern society must be released from all of its myriad bonds at one general time. The internal operations of the Soviet taxocracy and the west German plutocracy have to be undermined together. This does not mean war: it does not mean necessarily a close-knit conspiracy; it does imply a proliferation within both countries, as in all countries, of questioners and Tutors who penetrate everywhere, teach everywhere, and drain the blind and destructive forces of the modern age everywhere.
The fraction is not a Leninist party of highly organized, indoctrinated and disciplined revolutionary elite, as the Maoists would wish, or the Russian Party would prescribe. Like every revolution before it, Marxist-Leninism survives in details, not as a whole. Premier Mao-Tse-Tung's fresh message to people is to change society with their own hands, regardless of their poverty. To convey this message, he had to resort to astonishing anti-party and anti-bureaucratic measures between 1957 and 1968, in the Great Cultural Revolution.
The Common belief that a society motivated largely by individual greed is easier to bring down than one governed by collectivized force is wrong. The plutocratic system is like a steel mesh, composed of millions of individual self-seekers. It has no single vulnerable point, whereas a system that is vulnerable at the point of its top leadership holds individuals together by order and threats.
The erroneous belief arises partly because plutocratic societies punish those who offend them by less extreme penalties, whereas taxocratic and stratocratic orders believe logically in the efficacy of prison, torture, and death as punition. Moreover "foxy" regimes, much more than "leonine" ones, can create illusions of concessions and changes skillfully.14 It should be added, too, that the society of force and domination, with its exaggerated confidence in total planning by authority, and by its forthright denunciation of self-development and spiritual expression, exhibits itself more openly and vulnerably as the enemy of the new radical spirit.
For this reason, if for no other, one need not fear the cooperation and even leadership of some communists in the radical movements for they are leading against themselves, they are utterly inconsonant with the thrust of the movements, and they are in danger themselves of subversion. They will, until all of these facts become obvious, play the role of traitor at some point, but it this point can be anticipated and passed, they will have caused damaging confusion to their own former cause, just as Czechoslovak and Hungarian communist generated social sores within the soviet Union.
The 360ø war may degenerate into nuclear world war. A world war is defined as a violent contest between two or more great powers involving nuclear weapons and/or fully mobilized conventional armed forces. From a rational point of view, a government that feels compelled to resort to direct conflict with a nuclear power will choose to use its own nuclear weaponry only if it believes it cannot win a conventional struggle without extremely heavy losses. This rational threshold of nuclear attack depends upon the relative conventional advantage it thinks it has and of course upon its evaluation of the impact of nuclear bomb exchanges. Since all governments are now convinced that a war of nuclear weapons will injure their country beyond any conceivable advantage, such a war achieves the status of a constant in the rational equation.15
A report by the Center for Strategic Studies,16 whose supporters and writers can be regarded as the most informed adamant anticommunists in the United States, lends emphasis to this position.
As a percentage both of GNP and of total defense spending U.S. military research and development spending appears to be lower than that of the soviets, though in absolute terms it is greater17... The Soviet Air Forces, the Navy, Army, and the Soviet Rocket Forces are all equipped with nuclear weapons, in addition to conventional arms.18
Analyzing one by one the different weapons systems, both offensive and defensive, that great nuclear Powers possess, the Report must lend its opinion of superiority now to the Soviet forces and now again to the American.
In sum, the U.S.S.R., a decade after the first successful firing of an ICBM to full range, has attained an assured destruction capability against U.S. population and industry.19
Little hope is extended of restoring the condition of 1945-50, when the U.S.A. held overwhelming superiority. The Report wonders about the possibility of liberalizing changes:
Ultimately they might offer a promising long-term possibility of resolving the Cold War and of protecting U.S. interests without global conflict or the compromise of vital principle.20
Alternatively,
U.S. recognition of Soviet superiority would permit the U.S.S.R. to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, to demand concessions from the United States on many issues long in contention, to inhibit U.S. resistance to communist inspired or exploited wars of liberation, to fracture Western alliances, to achieve more dominant control over, the international communist movement and to attain greater support from the unaligned third world.21
However, as Thomas W. Wolfe, one of the Panel reviewing the final Report, wrote,
...the study neither manages to define the measure of superiority that would permit the Soviets to have their own way in the world, nor does it address the question of the political-social-economic costs to the United States of following a course that would keep such an objective permanently out of Soviet reach.22
Actually, the United States, like the U.S.S.R., is presently operating from a position of non-superiority.
Now the United States would have to gamble and possibly even bluff in calling a showdown on any matter that did not have a value equivalent to its continued existence...23
The Report concludes by advocating, rather uncertainly, the continued deployment of the most advanced weapons systems (implying new antiballistics-missiles systems); it urges increased technological research and development spending: the policy-maker "must constantly look for military applications the potential enemy may not have recognized or may have failed to pursue."24
A conventional war policy can, presumably, set its own limits since it can surrender or close out the operation if the losses are unbearable. The limit is probably roughly the same for all nations under consideration except China.25 For, although in the beginning of conventional wars, a taxocratic or stratocratic regime appears to be able to endure greater losses, the plutocratic regimes generally acquire an equal war morale as the engagements proceed, and need only be able to resist long enough to let their populations become charged up.
Such are the rational calculations. According to them, a nuclear war cannot occur because no conceivable conventional warfare morale can reach the threshold of willingness to engage in atomic warfare. Beyond, rational behavior lie two other possibilities.26
A psychologically beleaguered and weak-feeling American government, that is not capable of initiating conventional warfare but cannot stand surrenders of important objectives from time to time, is capable of threatening and then carrying out a nuclear attack, with or without having provoked a preliminary foreign attack or a facsimile thereof.
The second possibility of nuclear warfare can occur when the Soviet elite is sharply threatened, when it must act or fall. The Soviet elite is usually divided into factions which can only express themselves by covert alignments. It is most unlikely that any faction can seize power with a nuclear warfare program; it can however do so in the course of a series of grave reverses, whereupon in accelerating its steps to halt the reverses, it may escalate the war towards a nuclear denovement.
Because they fear conventional warfare, the American elite may flirt with nuclear warfare. Because they are more indeological and historically encased in an atmosphere of an unscrupulous power struggle, the Soviet elite may tolerate the principle of extreme "short-term" losses.27
Also,
the temporal dimension of the spiraling process becomes all important, for if it proceeds too rapidly there is no opportunity for other system forces to cut through the cycle before war breaks out.28
Should the worst happen, mankind would probably survive the holocaust and retain portions of its collective memories from all parts of the world. Europe was peopled by only 18 millions in 600 A.D., China by 37 millions in 705 A.D.29 America contained only four million persons when it became a nation, and under Peter the Great, the Russians numbered fourteen millions (ca. 1715), half the number of Poles today. The human race can raise itself up and multiply from a few thousands into millions within a century.
The world would have changes greatly30 but man will and must still search for the principles of good government, of Kalotic toparchy and consmarchy. To the degree that, before the catasrophe, these principles will have been disseminated throughout the earth, he will be capable of moving onwards and perfecting himself.
| 1. | Cf. Report from Iron Mountain, L.C. Lewin, ed. (new York: Dial Press, 1967); Karl W. Deutsch, "Changing Images of International Conflict," The Journal of Social Issues, XXIII, No.1 (1967), pp. 91-107. |
| 2. | Cf. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Praeger, 1963). |
| 3. | J.K. Zawodny, ed., Unconventional Warfare (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy, Vol. 341/1962/); Robert B. Asprey, "Guerrilla Warfare" in Encyclopedia Americana (1969). |
| 4. | Cf. I. Velikovsky, Ages in Chaos (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1952). |
| 5. | Selected Works, I, pp. 192-8. |
| 6. | "Hail to the Victory of People's War," p. 232-3. |
| 7. | Ricardo Rojo. My Friend Che (New York" Grove Press, 1968). The phrase "attaches itself to the peasant masses" may seem pretentious to non-participants, but it is the difference between being nourished as the guerrillas were in Cuba and being informed on by the peasants of Bolivia, a difference that meant Che's death. |
| 8. | Among many works on Vietnam, see Ralph K. White;s Misperception and the Vietnam War, XXII Social Issues (1966),pp. 1-167. Douglas Pike's Viet Cong (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966) is the fullest analysis, both psychological and organizational. Robert W. McColl, "A Political Geography of Revolution: China, Vietnam, and Thailand, : XI J. Conflict resolution (1967), p. 153 explains the guerrilla base concept. |
| 9. | Examples of news stories that appear in numbers: The London Times:"Chinese aid for Assam Rebels: Delhi fears another Vietnam," June 16, 1968; "Borneo Guerrillas Grow more daring,: July 24, 1968. The New York Times: "rising Filipino Terrorism is Led by `Monkees' and Huk 'Beatles'," November 25, 1968; "Many Flickering Wars Challenge Burma's Regime.: May 6, 1967; : Guerrillas beginning to operate in Central Panama," February 9, 1969; and "Peru-Another Cuba?", Drew Pearson, January 1969. |
| 10. | Cf. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (St ed., 1884, trans, 1939 New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), pp. 206-14. |
| 11. | Cf. Robert Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York; Presager, 1966). William J. Pomeroy writes from the side of pro-communist insurgency in Guerrilla and Counter- Guerrilla Warfare (New York: International Publishers, 1964). |
| 12. | Cf. Barrington Moore, Jr.' Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) |
| 13. | Many large cities today are in part "traditional cities" and should be understood as such in planning political change; cf. P.D. Milone, Urban Areas in Indonesia (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966) |
| 14. | Cf. Vilfredo Pareto, Mind an Society 1916; Livingston, 4 vols; (New York, Dover, 1963) who deals at length with the contrasting behaviors of military and plutocratic societies. Also Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). |
| 15. | At one time experts and advisers to governments were loath to admit the insufferability of a nuclear war. Now, statements like the following, by George Rathjens, and American professor formerly connected to the defense establishment, are commonplace: "Each side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other, regardless of the conditions under which nuclear war might develop... Thus, further increased in strategic force levels are not likely to offer either country new political options." ("The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's, " New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969). The Russian leaders generally share this view; cf. M.Tainsod, infra., p. 1101. |
| 16. | Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, 1967. Cf. Ralph E. Lapp, " A Biography of the ABM." New York Times Magazine, May 4. 1969, p.28. |
| 17. | Ibid., p.28. |
| 18. | Ibid., p.39. |
| 19. | Ibid., p.54. |
| 20. | Ibid., p.7. |
| 21. | Ibid., p.89 |
| 22. | Ibid., p.XV. |
| 23. | Ibid., p.90. |
| 24. | Ibid., p.96. |
| 25. | Still, Red Chinese calculations are not blind to nuclear power. They are logically bound to assert that hostile forces will be "bogged down in endless battle and drowned in a hostile human sea," and that "modern long-range weaponry, including atomic bombs, will be helpless and ineffective" (Hsiao Hua, Jan, 24, 1966); otherwise they would have to give up their claim to standing as a superpower. Cf. Ralph L. Powell, Maoist Military Doctrines (New York: American Asian Educational Exchange, 1968). Also see Harrison E. Salisbury, War between Russian and China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969). |
| 26. | The scenarios On education, by Herman Kahn (New York: Praeger, 1965) give a close analysis of the possible rational and non-rational calculations that may step up[ conflict between two nations. Also Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (New York: Harper and Row 1967.) |
| 27. | Stalin used people as cheaply as horses and bullets throughout his life. For example, Ivan Dzyuba, in a work published in the U.S.S.R. in 11965, declares that Stalin "destroyed several million Ukrainians" (Internationalism or Russification, London: Waidenfeld & Nocolson, 1968, p. 297). The Kremlin has yet to denounce this characteristic pre-communist and Czarist atavism. |
| 28. | Daniel Katz, in H.C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Hol Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 376. |
| 29. | Cf. Josaih C. Russell, "Late Ancient and Medieval Population," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (new series, Vol, 48, part 3, Philadelphia, Penna., 1958); John D. Durand, "The Population Statistics of China, A.D. 2-1953," XIII Population Studies (1960)m pp. 209-56. |
| 30. | Burnham Putnam Beckwith, The Next 500 Years (New York: Exposition Press, 1967), pp. 308-13. Cf. Tom Stonier, Tom Stonier, Nuclear Disaster (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1964) for a prognosis of the effects of a 20-megaton hydrogen bomb on New York. The traumatic effects of nuclear warfare make its preventions a non-negotiable demand "When we dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in addition to about 200,000 persons killed outright about an equal number were burned, blinded, maimed and poisoned," points out Dr. George Wald (letter to New York Times, March 18, 1969, p.44). Every child who will survive whole of body will pass life caring for the poor, the crippled, the blind, and the mad. All the world will live a cult of death and an orgy of expiation and desperate lust. |