

**STATEMENT OF ALFRED de GRAZIA, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE
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DR. DE GRAZIA. I am Alfred de Grazia, 772 Ynez, Stanford, Calif. I am executive officer of the Committee for Research in Social Science and associate professor of political science at Stanford University.

I have a prepared statement that I will read, with your permission.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so.

DR. DE GRAZIA. My professional specialization lies in the fields of public opinion, political parties, and pressure groups. Prior to joining the faculty of Stanford University, I taught at the University of Minnesota, Brown University, and Columbia University. In World War II, during which I rose from the rank of private to that of captain, I served first in artillery and then for about 3 years in psychological warfare. I engaged in seven campaigns in Africa, Italy, France, and Germany over a period of about 2½ years, and hold the Bronze Star Medal and other decorations and ribbons. I acted as consultant on one of the phases of the work of the Hoover Commission and have also been consultant to an official agency in the field of psychological warfare. I am author of *Public and Republic*, a study of American ideas of representative government; *Human Relations in Public Administration*; *The Elements of Political Science*; co-author of an *Outline of International Relations* and of other books and articles. My appearance before this Commission is not connected with the activities of any organized group. I also wish to make clear that any preferences that I may state are not to be construed as the official position of Stanford University in any way, and that any factual opinions or assertions are my own, unless otherwise indicated by me.

Public Law 414, the so-called McCarran Act, is based in part on errors of fact, is morally bad in several important respects, and contains various beneficial provisions. On the whole, I believe the act to be so deficient morally and tactically that it would have been better not to have passed it.

Its moral errors are several:

1. It refuses hospitality to mankind. Granted that the inescapable realities of politics and life preclude a completely open door to immigration, we might have improved our moral position somewhat by doubling the meager quotas of the nineteen twenties. Instead, the McCarran Act reduces opportunities for emigration to America.

2. It is morally wrong in that it discriminates among men by ethnic and cultural criteria considered by American ideals to be irrelevant or bad criteria. Thus,

(a) It perpetuates an ethnic quota system. The ethnic quota system prefers certain strains already present in American society to other strains not present or present in smaller numbers. I would regard this as a moral error on the grounds that a nation should abide by the principle of the equal worth and dignity of individual men, regardless of accidents of birth. Here again, however, the American people, or at least politically significant fractions of them, may not be prepared to welcome major changes in the system of apportioning quotas according to the relative proportion of the various ethnic

strains of the world presently existing in the American population. We cannot ask perhaps for a venturesome spirit among many politicians, even given that the spirit may be morally sound. However, if one considers the small number of immigrants admitted, it becomes quite possible that the American public would regard indulgently the abandonment of the quota system and the substitution therefore of universal standards of admission to American citizenship. It is easy to demonstrate that the physical and cultural effect of those few immigrants upon America would be negligible, even if they were all Esquimaux. Interested parties might do well to hark to the example of Turkey, a primitive and poor country, bordering on a hostile Soviet Union, which has admitted so large a number of immigrants in the past couple of years that the United States would have to admit a million immigrants a year to equal its record.

(b) Furthermore, whatever the degrees of demerit of the quota system, the retention of the 1920 census as the basis for computing national origins remains an essential moral defect of the McCarran Act. It is an additional and most gratuitous insult to perhaps every fifth American. It is gratuitous because only a few hundreds or thousands of quota positions would be changed; but it is none the less serious as an insult. I note in reading the reports of the House and the Senate committees on the bills that became the act, in question, that the absurd arguments of the early twenties concerning the "new" as against the "old" immigration were missing. I conclude that enlightenment plus the political power of the groupings affected adversely engendered caution among the bill's proponents; I suspect that some supporters privately nursed the prejudices of their ancient childhoods while publicly they gave some rather unconvincing assurances that the future might see a restudy of the origins of the American population. (Incidentally, I assume that the Commission is quite aware of the unsatisfactory nature of the census computations of national origins. It is a most difficult business. For example, if anyone here has ever visited near Houston, Tex., the majestic monument to the Texan victory over the Mexican Army in 1836, he probably noticed emblazoned in stone the fact that a veritable rainbow of nationalities composed the victorious Texan Army, including Mexicans. I wonder whether all those men found their way into the census computations of 1920.)

(c) Ethnic discrimination of a bad sort is also practiced in the provisions relating to the assignment of separate quotas of colonies, but this is perhaps a minor vice since, granted the ethnic quota system to begin with, a colony should perhaps be treated as ethnically distinct from the mother country. It does seem a little strange, however, that an Ulsterman should have such an advantage over an Australian in emigrating to America. That is one of the bad effects of the quota.

(d) A worse defect, masquerading beneath a virtue, is the provision that would-be immigrants of whatsoever country, provided they be half or more Asiatic by race, are chargeable to the quota of the Asian country, even though they be nationals and even natives of the country from which emigration is desired. One can only surmise from these provisions that the authors' conversion to twentieth-century science was only for the sake of appearances.

3. A third error is that of raising new distinctions between naturalized Americans and native Americans. A naturalized American will

never be able to rest secure that he will not be deprived of his nationality. He is restrained from political activities a native American might engage in. He is encouraged by the act to become a hysterical patriot before he has learned to be a simple patriot. Or else he is encouraged to passivity. This is one more contribution to the political sterilization of the American population. When millions of educated persons cannot engage in political activities because they work for the Government, when additional millions work under Government contracts, when more millions of teachers and educators are rendered anxious over their political beliefs and actions, and when other steps, like the present one, are taken to limit free political expression, we are compelled to believe that the American public is being slowly, systematically, and perhaps unconsciously reduced in size and in freedom of political action. We have never had enough ordinary people active in politics and in civic affairs. We are not likely to encourage more interest and involvement by legislation of this kind.

4. A fourth essential moral error of the legislation under study is implicit in the treatment of past political misbehavior on the part of foreigners. It would seem from the law, and we have little practice to see how the law works, and there are a few instances available from the administration of the preexisting law, that a foreigner who was once quite hostile to democracy and to the United States and who has reformed in a burst of confession and self-reproach is allowed admission sooner than one who wavered once or more times and never thought to adjure vehemently his behavior on such occasions. Although I believe there is an injustice here, I am not sure that I can offer a solution. We have had so much trouble trying to define and predict the loyalty of Americans in late years that only the most rash of experts would dare to make fine distinctions in the loyalty of men coming from a different culture. American consular offices are not ordinarily staffed by outstanding psychologists; and, granted the timidity that is common today in the agencies of the Government, I should imagine that the officials charged with making such distinctions of loyalty will be restrictive when the slightest doubt exists.

These, then, are the chief moral defects of the legislation under review. To a few people, they will seem perhaps to be virtues rather than defects. Confessing a rigid dislike for anyone not American, they will feel no need to give a foreigner an even break. But I would urge the Commission to pay no heed to such persons. Mustered against them are the highest ideals that mankind has evolved, represented in many more millions of Americans. And it ought not be forgotten also that such an attitude and hostility toward foreigners is merely a reflection of a similar attitude to his fellow Americans. Such a character is a spoiler of good human relations—abroad or at home.

You may have noticed that thus far I have mentioned nothing of an area of concern quite close to me. That is the area of psychological warfare. I have done so deliberately. I do not believe that America should be so crippled morally that the only excuse she can offer for doing good in foreign affairs is that thereby she can make other peoples like her more or do her bidding more easily. Nevertheless, some consideration of the psychological consequences of this legislation is necessary, because considerations of national survival in a world already committed to conflict are involved. Therefore, I shall point

up several technical and tactical errors of the McCarran Act of 1952.

1. The act is poor from the standpoint of psychological warfare because (a) it has a most unconstructive tone; it does not invite friends; it expresses disdain, narrow suspicion, and a scarcely concealed longing for an iron curtain such as the Russians are supposed to have; because (b) it continues a useless discrimination against colonials, Asiatics, and some European countries—hostile propagandists can read between the lines almost as well as we can; we can never stop them from lying, of course, but we need not give truth to their lies; and finally because (c) every rejected visitor is a potential anti-American. In respect to this last point, I would suggest that the Commission consider some recognition of the need to admit to America a steady flow of foreign leaders—even those of dubious affections—in order that the more friendly of them may be persuaded to work more actively for the cause of world freedom which is in peril and the unfriendly may be subjected to doubts and reconsideration of their views. The act provides no such organization. The Director of the Psychological Warfare Strategy Board might be the proper authority governing the admission and guidance of such persons.

2. The act is poor from the standpoint of national defense and foreign policy also because (a) needed foreign scientific and intellectual personnel are prevented from visiting America and confiding their work and friendship to us (the Commission has undoubtedly had much evidence on this point); (b) because we are spending large sums of money to send Americans abroad to educate foreigners at the same time that we make it difficult for foreigners to come here to learn the same things (the rather absurd consequence of this behavior is that American technical missions and educators abroad will be teaching many individuals who could not obtain visas to gain the same instruction in America).

3. The powers granted administrative officers under the act seem unwarranted and perhaps dangerous. At this early moment, no one can foresee the precise extent of confusion inherent in the administrative provisions of the act, but, on its face, the act would seem to invite confusion. It will probably continue providing foreigners with endless frustrations, even when they are obviously qualified to enter the country. The act is supposedly beneficial in that it represents "a needed codification" of immigration and nationality law. I am probably not versed sufficiently in that body of law to appreciate this need. To me, the law seems to form a shield for administrative indiscretion, double talk, and subterfuge. It would better have suited my tastes if much of the interminable description of things making for exclusion and deportation were replaced by a few general phases for consular guidance and a provision for appeal to an administrative tribunal.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROSENFELD. Professor, you speak in the early part of your statement of the unsatisfactory nature of the census computation of national origins.

Dr. DE GRAZIA. Yes.

Mr. ROSENFELD. Would you be able to provide the Commission with or advise the Commission where it could obtain some information more specifically devoted to that subject?

Dr. DE GRAZIA. Sir, I wouldn't be able to do that at this moment, I am referring here to an expression that I have heard several times

among experts on population. I am not myself such an expert, but I would be glad to help.

Mr. ROSENFELD. I have taken the liberty in noticing in your statement you are the executive officer on the Committee for Research in Social Sciences and associate professor of political science at Stanford University. If that committee has any relevant material, or if it could provide the Commission with any research, we would be glad to have it. Our time schedule is such that we would have to have it relatively soon. If you could afford to forward us any material on that, it would be very helpful.

Mr. DE GRAZIA. All right, sir; I will do that.

Mr. ROSENFELD. Secondly, in the same general line, in the light of your professional competency and in the light of psychological strategy in psychological warfare, would you be able to provide the Commission with documentation of foreign sources or other sources which would indicate the points that you have been making in connection with our foreign relations, the effect of our immigration laws, good or bad. I realize that both of those are very difficult requests to make of you.

Dr. DE GRAZIA. They are, indeed. The reason I did not bring that kind of evidence at this moment was the lack of time. I had only a few days' notice.

Commissioner O'GRADY. Has there been much research in the immigration field at Stanford University, concerning the points you mentioned regarding the criteria and concepts in the present quota system?

Dr. DE GRAZIA. Well, the fact is that the doctrines that were rather widespread about ethnic superiority and inferiority in the early twenties have been systematically refuted by every branch of science that concerns itself with those presumed inherent superiorities of different ethnic groups.

Now, the surprising thing is that it is rather difficult to put one's finger on this literature because the fact is so well assumed by anyone of any competency in the field that we haven't bothered to build up a great literature dispelling those myths. However, it would be quite easy to present a bibliography on the subject and perhaps a statement subscribed to by a group of scientists from different disciplines.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Is Mr. Van Sciver here?