

The American public has undergone the most formidable barrage in its history - a barrage of violently partisan sentiments and interminable discussions of current events. Yet today American public opinion is still formless and aimless. We fear the only seeming alternative to our aimlessness. But we are drawn closer to that alternative by our very tolerance for differences in opinions and by the skepticism which we have proudly considered the touchstone of a free society.

We know that modern man is not the first skeptic. Yet we fail to see that the modern Nazi is the first - and therefore an almost unrecognizable - example of skepticism turned to revolutionary nihilism. Because never before have insecurities been so widespread and techniques of exploiting them so perfected, skepticism has reacted against its makers. In effect, the Nazi elite has turned the natural bewilderment of the masses at skepticism into a violent revolt against intellectualism, and has made the natural skepticism of the intellectuals into a symbol of decadent democracy.

In Germany scientists and educators were the first victims of the contradictory results of skepticism. In the residue of democratic nations, democratic ideals may be the final victims. From political inaction to Fascistic reaction is the trend marked out for Europe in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth centuries. We may see that trend extend into the fifth decade, for the whole universe of democratic peoples, unless we can counteract the paralysing effects of the current brand of so-called democratic skepticism.

For these reasons, we shall try to define the alternatives to our present day aimlessness. We do not say that an immediate dichotomy exists, that a decision to go to war today or fascism tomorrow are the only ends in store for America. We do say that if America

does not acknowledge herself to be in this war, a number of alternatives present themselves, all involving a prolonged crisis situation, with the possibility of fascism rather than any more benign social order as the ultimate result.

It is not difficult to recall a few years ago, when democracy was supposed to be working and when it seemed as if war would soon be eliminated from the international sphere. During those days, Americans were content to be isolationists in large part. Even as late as 1937, the Gallup Poll showed 33 per cent of the American people desirous of joining the League of Nations, whereas, today, 49 per cent express that desire. American hostility towards the axis powers has increased since February of 1940, when 77 per cent of the people wanted no war with Germany even if England were losing. In May, 1941, the American Institute of Public Opinion Polls showed 20 per cent of the population favoring war against the Axis in any event and 66 per cent favoring war if it were necessary to prevent British defeat. *This attitude has persisted to date.* These changes indicate what Americans expect from the defeat of Britain and are, in themselves, phenomena to be recorded in analysing the effects of a Hitler victory on America.

Despite the preponderance of opinion favoring American intervention if Britain seems about to fall, Britain might yet lose the war. America might wait too long to decide if Britain is really losing, and Britain might make a separate peace or be conquered by invasion or starvation. It might be decided by the American leaders and people that England was so far gone as not to be worth saving. Or finally, Americans might be convinced by the non-interventionists that a change of mind was necessary and that it would be better policy not to help Britain, either by refusing aid or by giving inadequate

the orient, and that this will remain a stable (or perhaps ins-table) situation for an indefinite period.

But intense hostility between the United States and Germany today, the unendurable tensions of the armaments race, the basically different ideologies of the two states, conflicting trade routes, interferences by Germany in American internal affairs, and the crude lust for power would weight the scales heavily on the side of war. A large part of this essay will give additional evidences that permanent peace between America and Nazi Germany is more of a bad dream than a cold calculation.

In other words, there is a second possibility that war will finally break out after a few years of armed peace between Germany and America. The third possibility is that of an immediate attack: German leaders may decide that it is more profitable to attack the U.S. at once, via South America and the Arctic Ocean. If either of these last two possibilities materializes, there is no doubt but what we would have been better off fighting with Britain as our ally.

The occasions for conflict in South America would be numerous. Although Hitler could command all of Europe, the Americas might not submit tamely to domination by the United States. Certain countries of doubtful democracy might appeal for succor to the old-world masters. This is a very likely occurrence in view of

aid. What political consequences would most probably result should any of these conditions occur?

Should Germany defeat Britain without fighting the United States, three possible situations would present themselves, each of a different degree of probability. The first possibility is that Hitler will be master of Europe, the United States supreme in the Americas, and Japan ruler of

the age old policy of small nations to play one large nation against another. Even if Hitler does not intervene to weaken the United States, many men might be lost trying to hold the Americas together by force. The Latin-Americans have no love for Yankee imperialism; they fear it almost as much as they do Nazi attempts to destroy their autonomy. Belief in the altruism of the United States is not widespread. The United States has always had difficulty getting Argentina to cooperate in Pan-American affairs. We must remember that in South America there are strong traditional ties to Spain and large immigrant populations of Italians, Germans, and Japanese. When the collapse of England is followed by a lull for a year or so, during which time overt German propaganda in South America is sweetly reasonable and appeasing, those groups would be the first to scoff at the need for hemisphere defense. Pro-Yankee and Pro-Spanish (German controlled through Fascist Spain) political parties will appear, ostensibly to compete through democratic processes. The United States may well be victimized by blackmailing governments, flaunting seductive German trade offers before the eyes of American traders who have minimum wages and maximum hours to consider.

The alternative of blackmail is military control of the Latin Americas. This might require as many lives as the conquest of Europe has cost the Germans, as many years of preparation, as great hard-

ships on the civilian population, and as many men absent from home for years on end. That Hitler will hesitate to supply all material aid to anti-Americans on a tongue-in-cheeck lend-lease basis is a belief founded on ignorance of the great game of international Realpolitik.

At the risk of reiterating the commonplace, one might point to the number of utterances of Nazi leaders about German domination of the world. It is hard for one untutored in the German tradition not to scoff at Nazi words. There is never proof of intentions until they are translated into action. But it would seem, from what has happened, that men should have been plotting against instead of laughing at Hitler. The past few years have shown that the possibility of war after a few years of armed peace is much more to be expected than the possibility of a permanent armed peace. Moreover, even if armed peace should be possible for a period beyond our life span, one should not therefore feel optimistic about life during that time. What would America be like during the peace to follow Britain's downfall? Would the peace be as harrowing and destructive of democratic values as the war itself would be?

A famous aviatrix and appeaser, who could never have written were she concerned with kirke, k \ddot{u} che, kleider, und kinder, sees Nazism as the "wave of the future". America, too, must ride the wave in its bigger and better fashion. By giving ^{to} a social process inevitability, she makes it more acceptable. That the "wave of the future" should be covered by the scum of paganism, barbarism, and tribalism makes one believe that history

goes in great cycles or that her phase is a euphemism. Would she have said the same thing about the Hun horde which threatened Europe in the Middle Ages? What a flower of culture Genghis Khan would have nurtured to send to the far reaches of Europe! But her Asiatic fatalism is not at all typical of what we may expect from American Public Opinion.

There is no doubt that Americans will want to be armed to the teeth in face of German threats. The true pacifist is a tiny minority. Those who profess a peace policy today are strong for armaments against a possible invasion. Year after year we shall arm to match the Germans in guns, in man-power. To those who advocate peace and isolation, the extent of our armaments is a function of German strength. When Germany disarms, we shall, and the Germans will refuse to disarm as long as long as America does not. Disarmament has never worked; only idealistic countries like America actually disarm when they agree to do so. ~~Certainly~~, ~~Moreover,~~
~~future~~ mutual trust will not characterize relations between America and the Axis, and if experts were never able to tell what German air being stripped of its defensive weapons on the say-so of experts strength was, no nation would ever submit to its being stripped already so wrong in their estimations of German air strength of defensive weapons, and Russian weakness.

This caution is justified by the fate of others and the vagaries of chance. We have seen nation after nation take the chance that Germany meant well or could be appeased. One after another they took the bitterest potion of all - national surrender and abasement. Even if the olive branch is waved subtly and sooth-

ingly, there will always remain that horrible chance, - The Germans may not mean what they say!

Chamberlain had good reasons to believe that the Germans were turning towards the East and meant only to stabilize their Western frontiers. He may even have seen a 50-50 chance that such was their aim. But he lost the gamble, and he was called a fool for his miscalculations. Everyone admits the principle of insurance. The chance of one's home being destroyed by fire is minute, but the careful owner has his home insured ~~against~~ fire. No matter how slim the chance of national destruction, it is worth arming against. The British have almost lost in five years what it took five centuries to build. America has as much to lose.

The American public will be far more divided on other subjects than it will be on the advisability of rearmament. There is certain to be a burst of popular expression should the news of Britain's surrender break. Public opinion would react in a confused and contradictory fashion, and a new frame of mind would characterize the nation.

America would be isolated and Americans would not be able to "live alone and like it". Hitherto, it is we who have rebuffed the attentions of others; we have received the flirtations of others and have scorned them. But if Britain falls, America would be like some girls who don't appreciate the company of men until they become old maids.

Another group of appeasers would arise on the heels of a British defeat. They would have the nation make peace instead of fighting the whole world. They would draw sustenance from the inevitable conciliatory gestures of victorious Germany.

New discussions of defense would center around the old question of whether it is possible to attack the United States, and, if this is considered possible, where our first line of defense would be. Instead of the Atlantic Ocean, the farthest island outpost of the new world would be suggested and advocated as our first line. Others would decry any concern with the Argentine and point to the jungles of Brazil as ~~an impenetrable~~ barrier.

There would be a new and great reluctance to attack Germany anywhere in any case, because of the new uncertainty as the chances of victory. Today, Americans are convinced that America and Britain can defeat Germany and Italy. With Britain gone, awful doubts would circulate in people's minds. Whereas today Americans ask themselves, "Is the gain worth the effort?", tomorrow they might ask themselves, "Will all effort be in vain?".

Conciliation with Germany would be fostered by the Germans do not attack the Western Hemisphere immediately and stop overt propaganda in the Americas. There would be a decrease in American anxieties about the immediacy of attack, reenforced by a diminution of the willingness to sacrifice material possessions in order to be completely armed. In other words, in the face of a crisis as judged by all objective standards, a considerable number of people would cry out for a slackening of war preparations. The same gestures

which lulled part of Europe into a false sense of security are bound to affect some Americans. This demand would be accompanied by the cry which is heard even now, that Americans turn their attentions to domestic problems. To the extent that this succeeds, America would be psychologically unprepared for a great war.

On the whole, such will probably not be the ~~majority~~ opinion but it will have a great deal to do with the increase in dictatorial tactics in order to prepare the nation physically and psychically. It is supreme folly to speak of forgetting about foreign affairs and concentrating on domestic problems, even if ^a disputable distinction is accepted. Most Americans would never be convinced that they should turn their attention to international problems; it would require the muzzling of the press, which prints whatever interests people. It would be as difficult as educating people against sex. Most of all, such naiveté ignores the principles of the crisis at stake. Whatever attention is diverted to internal problems would be more regressive and oppressive than progressive. People would be more concerned with restrictions and preservation of the status quo than with social change.

New political attitudes would come to the fore. Democracy would fall into disrepute among many people. This would be a product both of success of Nazism abroad and the seeming failure of democracy at home. Those who admire success and efficiency would be attracted by Nazi conquests, or at least they would ~~require~~ a

certain respect for Nazism. Those who have wanted the United States to act vigorously and to give all-out aid to Britain would be disgruntled and disappointed. There would arise two schools with dictatorial tendencies, based on these reasons. Many liberals would subscribe to a crisis government in the hands of Franklin D. Roosevelt seeing in it the only alternative to a dictatorship by the right. The apathy of some people would increase the tendency towards dictatorship out of sheer necessity: no matter how furious the pace of preparedness, it will not satisfy the extremists that there is no sabotage of the national defense efforts.

The crisis would find men preoccupied with the single question of national security. Opposition would be squelched without the consideration born of the Constitution of Christian Principles. A strange climate would settle on America for a number of years. Conservatives would be more than ever concerned about the rights of private property at the same time that radicals and even really liberal persons would be suppressed. The right to strike would be an ideological curio. Civil rights would be severely circumscribed and the number of Frank Hagues would multiply throughout the land.

Whereas in a war, a lapse from democracy is justified by a well defined emergency, namely, the winning of the war, in the case of an armed peace, a ~~p~~lapse from democratic methods would be justified by a badly defined emergency. No one could say positively when the crisis was over, or whether it would ever be over. It could be easily

perpetuable beyond necessity.

War preparations will absorb a great part of American energies, and the wheels of industry will ~~hem~~, though not for food or clothing. Young men, who today would fight the war against Germany face the prospect of paying half their income for national defense only to fight a longer war later on. Not only will they pay in material goods for the long and ~~cheerwating~~ ^{energizing} process. They will pay in psychic goods, in the secure family life they may crave, in the freedom to travel, in their independence and initiative. The insecurities of the younger generation will be augmented and extended over an indefinite period of time. Millions of men who have just gone through a period of constant depression must endure a period of constant drilling, with continuous economic deprivations and without the solace of permanent peace. The years 1934-40 would seem like years of stability when compared with the years to follow or the years before.

Far-reaching changes would be wrought in the structure of government. Signs of what one prominent businessman called a bureaucracy that "eats holes in our liberties" are beginning to be manifest. The federal government is making tens of thousands of new appointments to emergency jobs. Commissions and bureaus are multiplying, and governmentalization of business is the order of the day. The greatest increase in governmental centralization that ever occurred in America was born of the World War. The same

centralization for ten times that period would be almost impossible to shake off. It would come as a result both of the increase in the functions of government and in the increasing controls over hitherto state and local affairs, and would come without the time for observation and criticism found in a gradual centralization.

The federalism on which our country is founded, whereby individual differences are proliferated and prejudices are localized, would fast become extinct. The line of demarcation between what is properly national and what is local would become an academic problem, of no interest to the overwhelming Leviathan.

The Conservatives would not only fulminate against an increasing centralization. They would have to gaze upon an executive of ever increasing power. No doubt, the American tradition of democracy is stronger than in any other country. But this should not blind one to the effects of slow erosion, which is exactly what would take place in an armed peace. The effects of a short emergency may be thrown off, as were those of the World War. But an extended practice would become part of the national tradition. It would even become constitutional through habit and judicial interpretation. Presidential powers would be increased beyond the legal and efficient limitations of the office. Congress, the only representative of local authority, would be irreparably weakened. State government would bee during the whole period, taking much of the character of German states when Bruening ruled by decree.

For state and local governments depend for their vitality upon regional and local problems, which may best be handled by them. But in an emergency, what problems are local?

With tremendous expenditures by the Federal government for national defense over a decade, state and local governments would be less and less inclined to appropriate funds for local enterprises and improvements. The subordination of everything to defense means priorities in social legislation as well as everything else in industrial production.

The vast economic changes, the reallocation of productive resources, the decrease in expenditures on domestic needs, would do more than centralize politics. Class issues would be driven deeper into our party system. The conditions under which our two-party democracy works involves some fundamental agreements. Insecurities heighten convictions. What one man does not think is worth fighting for at one stage of the game is something he is willing to kill his neighbor over at a later stage. The traditional parties may break up and rearrange themselves into more than two parties, drawn tightly along class or ideological lines. A majority would then be harder to obtain in Congress, and again increased integration would take place, with the executive ruling by decree, as happened in Germany between 1930-32 and in France between 1937-39. In view of the augmented popular expression at every

public act, the legislature would content itself with giving the executive more and more responsibility.

There would be a party of war and a party of peace. One cannot be sure under what symbols of war and peace they would parade, but he can be sure that the people would recognize the distinction, just as they know what the Democrats and Republicans represent despite similar party platforms.

There might be a party of those "hyphenated" Americans whose loyalties have been traditionally claimed by their Fatherland. Another active political group might include the nativist brandishers of the flaming cross, who would rather persecute a small minority than fight a dangerous foe. America would be divided into the ostriches and hysterics, those who see anything to worry about, and those who are goaded to frenzy by the crisis and the self deception of the ~~estrishes~~. The struggle between the factions would be bitter and short, perhaps ending with the only means of pacifying the unruly factions - dictatorship.

The ideal of an American nationality would be difficult to realize, since the various racial and national groups would tend to split from each other and draw ~~hard and fast~~ rigid social and ~~class~~ distinctions. Intermarriage between people of different nationality, and people of old and new immigration, groups would be infrequent instead of a common occurrence; the melting pot would become a witches caldron.

There would be little sign of peace and quiet in their tumultuous scene. The natural ~~denouement~~ of the crisis situation is war. The high pitch of national excitement and fear would breed the martial spirit. An entrenched military bureaucracy would be disciplined to abridge its powers and functions. Creeds of peace would not penetrate hysterical minds, and war would finally become acceptable psychologically when strategically it would be most hazardous. The British did not adjust after Munich to the warlike frame of mind and only belatedly adjusted after the crushing defeats of the Spring of 1940.

After Munich, few Frenchmen predicted peace. Today, in America when the crisis has hardly begun, two thirds of the American people foresee the United States participating in the war. Though only 20% of the people are in favor of war now, the majority think that war, though regrettable, is inevitable under the present circumstances. The terrors of a peace today will produce the war of tomorrow.

The educational system is already retrenching for the emergency: tuition receipts are markedly reduced. Red-baiting campaigns among professors are already in evidence. The tenseness of the situation will be heightened by Nazi influences and "solutions" they suggest for our problems, until the various freedoms of the constitution will seem macabre. America can recover from a short war, but the strain of waiting for "the wave of the future" to dash upon us will be disastrous to the democratic way of life.

International relations ~~will~~ consists mainly of insults and threats.

International scientific groups, postal unions, commercial organizations, etc. will be passed and the empires will face each other with fear and hatred.

Whenever a revolution occurs in the world (and Nazism is a nihilistic type of revolt) there is a strong tendency for the ideas of the revolution to diffuse to other countries. The ideas of the French revolution spread over the map of Europe despite intense opposition from the ruling classes of those countries. Avoidance of the spread of the fascist revolution can be accomplished by effective and energetic counter-attack and eradication of the movement at its source. Only in such a manner can a partial incorporation of hated ideas be prevented.

But the sceptics with which democracies are surfeited will claim that there is no justification for their imposing their ideas on other peoples. Militancy is foreign to the sceptic's methods, which are endless debate and compromise. The sceptics are unrealistic. They do not realize that their freedom to remain tolerant, critical, and free is worth fighting for. They are beleaguered by the perfectionist principle, that to adopt for a while the methods of the devil is the same as being the devil. Insofar as a man believes this, he is lost, for the fanatic will impose his ideas on him or the masses will react to the apparently hopeless mental

confusion of the leaders of the democratic society. The great danger to democracy in a crisis situation is that everyone will not cooperate, and more savage forms of eliciting consensus will be used.

One of the most disastrous contagious of Nazi practices is the separation of public from private morality. This is a process which, once germinated, ramifies throughout the national structure. It would be intangible, but just as real in its effects on our country as fierce competition with Nazi products. To allow a man to do in a public capacity what he could not do in a private capacity defeats the ends of the state and pollutes private morality. Before long he cannot distinguish between an end of power and a means of power.

The Nazis have no philosophy, contrary to their frequent references to the writings of Rosenberg and Hitler. Rather, their behavior is motivated by certain drives followed for their own sake. They have an urge to wreck completely destruction, to desecrate all established values, and to gain unlimited power. They exalt ~~blind~~ blind obedience and exalt in sheer activism. The Nazis have glorified war, magnified racial, religious, and national animosities, crushed individual and civil liberties, and profited by the forced labor of conquered peoples. Not one of these things is a guess. Each and every one is a fact stated by the Nazis themselves, proudly and becomingly. They should be accepted in argument as premises admitted by both sides, just as ~~2+2=4~~ 4.

The American political system will be stretched to incorporate features of the Nazi system during the inter-war period. German

propaganda, underground and above-ground, will either make some Americans its converts to the idea that ~~any~~ crime is justified in the gaining and holding ~~of~~ power, or cause Americans to commit public indecencies in order to hold their own structure. Hitler's methods will be America's. Machiavelli's axioms will be part of our unwritten constitution. Nevertheless, many people who have lived nightmares because of the Communist Revolution are most lustful about climbing into bed with another World Revolution.

It seems then, that the escape from American Imperialism lies in meeting today the problem of the morrow. A generation of "hemisphere defense" will ~~see~~ the Yankee name despised in Latin-America for our inevitable interferences and impositions. It seems that the escape from a generation of insecurity and waiting for something to happen is to guarantee England's victory, no matter what the cost. It seems that the only escape from many years of total preoccupation with war and international conflict is to settle the international scene now. It appears that the alternative is not peace or war, but action now, or years of violence at home and a peace without profit, security, or liberty, culminating in a disastrous war alone.

The growth of an integrated world society seems inevitable in view of the rapidity of communication ~~of~~ and the need for order without so that we may have order within. The question remains as

to who should do the integrating. It faced the Romans when they saw the increasing might of Carthage. It faced the Franks when the Saracens swept up through Spain. It faces the Christian-Liberal world today. If this be the dilemma, then, if it is a matter of who shall set the standards of the new order, no policy of supineness is the solution. Self-preservation demands a conquering spirit.